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Abstract:  
On 14 June 1916 the Danish army purchasing officer in London, Cavalry Major  
Count Frederik ”Fritz” Moltke, had a working lunch with his contact in the Admiralty, 
the Danish language speaking Lieutenant Commander Frank Stagg. From the next 
table a MI5 counter-intelligence officer monitored the conversation that was meant 
to expose Moltke as a German spy and pass him incorrect information about the 
recent naval battle off Jutland. Later that summer Denmark was forced to transfer 
Moltke to the U.S., but at that time the disinformation passed to him and reinforced 
by the Danish Minister in London had already worsened a senses in Copenhagen 
that Denmark was moving closer become involved in the war. The article follows the 
chain of disinformation and events. 
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Introduction
On 14 June 1916 three men lunched in a London restaurant, two at the same 
table. One was the Danish Count Frederik Moltke, Ritmester (Cavalry Major) 
of the Guards Hussar Regiment, the Danish Household Cavalry. The two others 
were intelligence officials. The officer sharing Moltke’s table was Lieutenant-Com-
mander Frank Stagg of the Secret Intelligence Service, Moltke’s official contact 
since his arrival in Britain one-and-a-half years earlier. The other intelligence 
officer was there to monitor the conversation for MI5, the counter-intelligence 
service, and to report Moltke’s reactions. He was probably the officer responsible 
for Moltke’s case.
The meeting took place only two weeks after the great naval battle off Jut-
land. A few days later, in the evening of 5 June, the Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Kitchener, and his staff were drowned when the armoured cruiser, HMS 
Hampshire, his transport from Scapa Flow to meetings in Russia, was lost in 
a massive explosion off the Orkney Islands. The explosion took place when 
the cruiser struck a mine laid by the U-boat U-75, but on 14 June the reason 
was still unclear and there were rumours that the explosion might have been 
caused by a device placed on board by German saboteurs before departure, or 
by a German U-boat torpedoing the vessel after information from a spy. 
The two sources that describe the meeting seem to disagree about who 
took the initiative. The diplomatic despatch of the Danish Envoy, Count Hen-
rik Grevenkop-Castenskiold, noted that it was Stagg who invited the Danish 
officer.1 However, an anonymous report about the meeting written three days 
later on the basis of information from Stagg and the observations of the other 
participating intelligence officer emphasises that Moltke had invited Stagg by 
telephone the previous evening. The reason Moltke gave was that the Danish 
1  Rigsarkivet (Danish State Archives) hereafter RA: London, diplomatisk repræsentation 1913-
1929. Politiske rapporter (afleveret 1949). Pk. 467 1916-1917: Ritmester F. Greve Moltke L.954 
of 14-06-1916 “Memorandum til Det kongelige Gesandtskab i London”; Depeche Fortrolig Nr. 
XXXVII of 15-06-1916 to Udenrigsministeriet.
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Government wanted additional information about the naval battle. He would 
be glad to receive new information that could correct the Danish impression 
of a German victory.2 
It is most likely that both sides had a role in arranging the meeting. The Danish 
envoy had probably directed Moltke to clarify the extent to which the Admiralty 
supported the worrying views about the post-battle naval situation expressed in 
“The Economist” of 10 June. The periodical suggested that cruiser losses had seri-
ously weakened the German Navy.3 This was important to the Danes because any 
defeat of the German Navy in the North Sea was seen as likely to be followed by a 
British attempt to enter the Baltic Sea through the Danish Straits.4 
Stagg also needed a meeting. As we shall see he had both a personal and a pro-
fessional motive to support the already existing MI5 opinion that Moltke was a 
security risk because he might be a German spy. If the lunch gave the counter-in-
telligence service additional arguments why Moltke should leave England, this 
would clearly be in Stagg’s interest. 
A likely sequence of events that would be in line with the information of both 
2  The National Archives of United Kingdom, hereafter TNA, FO 371/3361, pp. 341-349. 
3  RA. UMN, Gruppeordnede sager, pk. 10-32, læg 10.G.62 “Eventuel engelsk aktion i danske far-
vande”, The Economist, 10-6-1916, “The Naval Battle and the Peace Question”.
4  For Danish threat perceptions: Michael H. Clemmesen, Det lille land før den store krig. Dan-
ske farvande, stormagtsstrategier, efterretninger og forsvarsforberedelser omkring kriserne 1911-13, 
(Odense 2012), especially chapters 38, 43.
From the previous week: Kitchener on the way to lunch with Jellicoe on board HMS Iron 
Duke a few hours before his death. (Imperial War Museum)
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sources is that Moltke asked his Admiralty contact, Stagg, for a meeting on the 
request of Castenskiold. After having consulted MI5, the intelligence officer pro-
posed the lunch format, and Moltke invited him to the following day.  
The disinformation which Stagg used as a tool to provoke Moltke and achieve 
his purpose successfully shows that he was fully aware of Danish perceptions of 
the threat. It would trigger three months of intense war scare in Denmark, be-
cause it confirmed and reinforced the Envoy’s and Danish authorities’ worries. 
This may or may not have been Stagg’s deliberate intent. 
As a notorious activist he may have wished to provoke a change in Denmark’s 
strategic position that would open new possibilities for British warfare in North-
ern Europe. On the other hand he could not know that his information would be 
consolidated and reinforced by the Danish envoy. However, no matter what Stagg 
intended beyond assisting the MI5, the final results would act as a catalyst for the 
start of new German war planning against Denmark in late August 1916, and 
provoked a formal decision one and a half months later by the leadership of the 
Royal Navy and British Army that nothing should be done to assist that country 
if Germany invaded. 
Purpose of the article
The article has a double purpose and is divided in two parts to achieve both. 
The first part charts the paths of Henrik Moltke and Frank Stagg up to the lunch 
meeting and tries to identify Stagg’s likely combination of motives for the disin-
formation that was sent to Copenhagen. Thereafter the article seeks to identify 
the effects in Denmark of Stagg’s warning. The article ends with a short narrative 
about what happened later. 
The Danish War Office purchasing officer in 
London, the elegant Guards Hussars Major, 
Count Frederik Josias Valdemar Otto Moltke. 
He was 39 years old when the lunch meeting 
took place. (RA)
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It is written in English rather than Danish to allow other than Nordic language 
readers some insight into the delicate situation of a small neutral state placed be-
tween major powers involved in an increasingly total conflict. By way of working 
in English, I have been able to benefit from a close cooperation with to distin-
guished British naval historians, Dr Richard Dunley from start to finish and Dr 
Stephen Cobb in the final phase.
Moltke, Stagg and the latter’s motives
Moltke’s version of the meeting
Moltke wrote his report to Castenskiold right after the working meal. Lieuten-
ant-Commander Stagg, “employed in the Admiralty Intelligence Division” had 
used the occasion to make various statements about the Danish attitude to Eng-
land after the naval battle. Moltke noted that “Commander Stagg speaks and reads 
Danish fluently and has often been in Denmark.” Stagg stressed that he had been 
astonished that Danish newspapers had described the battle as a German victo-
ry. This was a major mistake, and “it could have very serious consequences if the 
Royal Government shared this opinion”. The truth about the outcome was that 
all the valuable cruisers of the German advanced screen had been lost or heav-
ily damaged and were now unusable. Thus Stagg reinforced the information in 
the “Economist” article. The German battle fleet had also been severely damaged. 
It would take three months before the German Navy would be ready for action 
again. Stagg then told Moltke to consider as a military professional what this 
would mean for the general situation, as “the English Navy had gained freedom of 
action to use its power for other missions than keeping the German Navy contained 
and away from the English coasts. The logical next task for the navy was to fight 
for control of the Baltic Sea and an expedition against the Kiel Canal, Hamburg 
and the German Naval Bases.” Stagg was unhappy that the British politicians had 
succeeded in diverting forces to Gallipoli that should have been used to attack the 
Canal via Jutland. However, with the death of Kitchener, who had been against a 
violation of Danish neutrality, and the result of the naval battle there was a new 
situation. The British Army would now act as General Robertson, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, decided. Robertson was an admirer of the German Gen-
eral Staff, and in any situation he always asked himself what the Prussians would 
do. Neutral rights meant nothing to him. 
Stagg had been excited and insisted that it was a life-or-death struggle for Eng-
land and that it was the duty of the Admiralty to exploit the success of the battle. 
Stagg said that he was personally a friend of Denmark, but he considered it to 
be an “unforgivable” mistake not to act now. “The welfare of three million Danes 
should not stand in the way of the future of the British Empire.” The French sup-
ported a landing in Jutland and he hoped that the ongoing conference in Paris 
would decide in favour of Admiralty wishes. Moltke’s memorandum does not 
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mention any other British participant at the lunch, which makes it likely that he 
was witnessing what happened from a nearby table.5 
Castenskiold’s 10 and 15 June despatches
The Envoy, Count Grevenkop-Castenskiold, had already dealt with the post-bat-
tle situation in his despatch of 10 June. It had been triggered by the “Economist” 
article. The Envoy noted that the Admiralty considered that many key German 
warships now needed months of repair. This meant that the situation might de-
velop in a critical direction for Denmark if the British Government decided that 
the time had come to try a naval entry into the Baltic Sea. Such an operation was 
likely to be encouraged by Russia. The mood against Germany was extremely 
bitter after the loss of Hampshire and Lord Kitchener. It was generally considered 
likely that the explosion had been caused by a bomb on-board the cruiser, and 
that the otherwise well-kept secret about the Field Marshal’s voyage had been 
sent to Germany by a spy in the War office or Admiralty
On 15 June the Envoy forwarded Moltke’s report with another despatch to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Castenskiold stressed that Stagg’s information 
matched what he had heard at higher levels in the Admiralty and reported on 10 
June. The Royal Navy considered Jutland a victory. “Mr. Stagg may be regarded 
as a hothead, but I believe that a large number of army and naval officers share 
his opinion, and it is supported by newspapers such as “Morning Post” and “Daily 
Mail”.” The view of Stagg as a “hothead” probably refers to the Turner incident 
in late 1915 (to be described later). Even if the Count personally doubted that 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would decide to conduct another very 
costly combined land and sea operation after the Dardanelles experience, violat-
ing neutral territory after having condemned German action against Belgium, 
“it is however always best to accept that a time might come where Denmark would 
be requested to join the Allies”. There was no doubt that any British action against 
the Straits and Kiel Canal would receive warm support from France and Russia.6
5  RA: London, diplomatisk repræsentation 1913-1929. Politiske rapporter (afleveret 1949). Pk. 467 
1916-1917: Ritmester F. Greve Moltke L.954 of 14-06-1916 “Memorandum til Det kongelige Ge-
sandtskab i London”. The quoted text translated into English by the author.
6  RA: London, diplomatisk repræsentation 1913-1929. Politiske rapporter (afleveret 1949). Pk. 467 
1916-1917: Depecher Fortrolig Nr. XXXVI of 10-06-1916 & Nr. XXXVII of 15-06-1916 to Uden-
rigsministeriet. The quoted text translated into English by the author.
The envoy attached “The Economist”  
10-6-1916 article, “The Naval Battle and 
the Peace Question”, to his dispatch from 
that day. Here the article’s information 
about ships sunk. (RA)
124  Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen
MI5’s version
MI5 and Stagg’s version dated 17 June 1916 was attached to the later rejection 
of a Danish request (from November 1918) to clear Moltke of the suspicion of 
having acted as a German spy. The arguments for the rejection will be covered 
below. In the MI5 report, Stagg’s identity was left out. He was simply “a Naval 
Officer working in the Intelligence Department at the Admiralty, who is personally 
known to Count Moltke”. Actually Stagg had formally retired from the Royal Navy 
to join the Secret Intelligence Service (then MI1c) two years earlier. According to 
the report, Moltke had phoned him the day before and invited him to the meal, 
because the Danish Government was “very anxious about the result of the North 
Sea battle”. Moltke would be “very glad” if Stagg could give him any facts “which 
would put the matter in a different light from that in which his Government saw 
it”. So according to Stagg the suspicious thing that Moltke had done was to seek 
information that would give the British version of events to counter the German 
version that seemed to have convinced the Danish Government. This cannot re-
ally be considered an anti-British activity. From all we know of Moltke it was the 
exact opposite. However, the report continued that “Obviously Count MOLTKE 
was seeking for information which has not been made public and which, presuma-
bly, it is the intention of the Admiralty to keep secret”. 
Stagg had been “instructed to see Count Moltke, and to lead him on and dis-
cover what he really wanted to know”. According to the report, Moltke had been 
“pumping” Stagg. He “persisted that his Government were nervous as to the result” 
(of the battle). He had not heard convincing evidence that the victory had been 
British and asked for details of the battle “and the German ships which we believe 
have been lost”. 
The latter indicates that Moltke sought information to counter the German 
narrative. He sought information that was vital for Danish security, information 
that any Danish diplomat in both Germany and England was obliged to seek in 
order to inform the country’s decision makers.
However both Stagg and the other officer present “were most infavourably im-
pressed and conceived great distrust of his motives,”7 in spite of the knowledge of 
Denmark and its very difficult strategic situation that Stagg would have possessed 
from his time in the country before the war. He had worked as a naval intelligence 
operative, officially studying Danish language in Copenhagen. He did not advice 
the other agent that Moltke simply had to seek this information. Instead Stagg 
had fed Moltke misinformation which, if believed, had the potential to destabilise 
Denmark’s geo-strategic situation, and thereby he acted directly contrary to Brit-
ish interests which were to maintain Denmark as an unoccupied neutral country. 
However, the MI5 report of the lunch meeting did not describe what information 
Stagg had fed Moltke to challenge him. It is unclear whether the MI5 agent only 
witnessed the meeting, depending on Stagg’s narrative of what had happened, or 
7  TNA, FO 371/3361, pp. 345-347.
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if he knew enough Nordic languages to understand the conversation. If the report 
described what had been said, the Foreign Office might have been piqued. As 
documented later neither the British diplomats, the Admiralty nor British Army 
wanted a change to Danish neutrality. 
It unclear if or to which degree that Stagg’s purpose was to send misinforma-
tion about the post-Jutland situation to Denmark or Germany. If that had been 
his main aim and he had really believed that Moltke was a German spy and had 
wanted to make the information credible in Berlin, he might have fed the infor-
mation to the Dane in an indirect way that would have enhanced its credibility. 
Open information volunteered by a known intelligence officer is not something 
that will convince the opposition. Stagg could only consider it likely that the En-
voy, Count Castenskiold, would make his misinformation credible, if Moltke told 
Stagg about the Envoy’s worries when he asked for the meeting. We cannot know 
if that happened.
 The impression given by the 17 June report is simply that Stagg wanted to get 
Moltke to seek information from him that was highly classified, so that the au-
dience, the counter-intelligence officer, would have additional arguments to get 
Moltke out of England. 
Frederik Moltke and his time in London until December 1915
In a Danish parallel to the Shell Crisis amongst the belligerents, the Danish Army 
and its strong supporter, King Christian X, had realised in the first months of 
1915 that the very low stocks of artillery and small arms ammunition were a crit-
ical flaw in Danish defence capabilities. In the summer of that year a compromise 
was reached between the King and the Social-Liberal Government that wanted 
to reduce the Army’s still substantial neutrality guard. The King got a decision 
to dispatch purchasing officers abroad and the government pressed on with its 
reductions in the neutrality guard. 
Count Moltke was sent to London. His main task was to buy – and clear 
through the British blockade – metals and semi-finished products that would 
enable the factories of the Danish Army ordnance agency, the “Army Technical 
Corps” to produce the additional ammunition for field artillery and small arms 
essential in any extended defence against a German invasion. At the same time 
Deputy Director Viggo Falgren-Schäfer and Captain Gunnar Petersen were sent 
to the U.S. to shop for the Army Technical Corps from the Danish Consulate in 
New York. 
Moltke had been working for the Army Technical Corps since the start of the 
war. He was probably seconded from his regiment to the Corps at the start of the 
war because he was one of his country’s aviation pioneers, specialising in free 
balloons. He had been a founding member of the Danish Aeronautical Society in 
1909, had got his balloonist certificate the following year, and published articles 
about military use of balloons in the Danish Military Review. In 1912 Moltke had 
been a driving force behind the collection of volunteer contributions to purchase 
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the first observation balloons for the Copenhagen Fortress. They were to be used 
in case of a German siege. It is likely that Stagg met Moltke, or had at least heard 
of him, during his time in the small Danish capital before the war.
The Technical Corps was responsible for all army weapons, but it still had a 
clear professional focus on artillery matters including support equipment such as 
observation balloons. 
Prior to his transfer to London, Moltke had already proven his skills during a 
purchasing visit to Germany. During spring 1915 he visited a number of compa-
nies to investigate the possibilities of buying what the Corps needed for its activ-
ities, including the Riedinger Company, the main German balloon manufacturer 
that had also produced the privately funded balloons purchased before the war. 
The Technical Corps was now looking for opportunities to get equipment to ex-
pand the one observation balloon element into a regular balloon park to sup-
port the Copenhagen Fortress. Moltke quickly reached agreement with the firm. 
Denmark would replace the raw materials used in the production. However the 
balloons only reached Denmark in October after the German authorities had giv-
en formal export permission. By then the proven negotiator Moltke had already 
been dispatched on his more general purchasing mission to London.8 
8  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, A. Material, Gen.major Nørresø 1905-
1921, Pk. 1, “2. Ballonhylstre…” no date; A. Riedinger Ballonfabrik, Augsburg af 2-2-1915 to 
Frederik Moltke, the free 
 balloon pioneer, ascending 
with his balloon “Danmark” 
before the war (his grandson’s 
photo  collection)
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On 30 July Count Castenskiold had notified the Foreign Office that Moltke 
would arrive in England by ship in early August “to pay a visit to this country in 
order to try to obtain export licenses for certain articles to the Danish Army”. After 
the Home Office’s approval on 4 August, the Foreign Office gave its permission on 
7 August. On 14 August the British Envoy to Copenhagen informed London that 
the Count would leave the next day, on 15 August, meaning that he would reach 
England a couple of days later.9 Danish authorities had been trying to purchase 
military equipment in Britain since spring that year, without success. In April the 
Foreign Office informed the British Minister in Copenhagen, Sir Henry Lowther, 
that the industry had difficulty in meeting British Army requirements, let alone 
those of neutrals. In May Lowther informed London that the Danish reaction 
had been to send a retired general to England with an extended shopping list that 
included range finders, binoculars and various chemicals and machine tools for 
 Hochwohlgeboren Herrn Rittmeister Graf Moltke, Kopenhagen; Afskrift af Chiffertelegram fra 
Gesandtskabet i Berlin af 19-4-1915; Report about Moltke’s visit to Soemmerda: Til Hærens 
Laboratorium of 28-4-1915; T.A.Poulsen: Hærens ballonpark, Dansk Flyvnings Historie (Co-
penhagen 1936), pp. 39, 41. The quoted text translated into English by the author.
9  TNA. FO 383/85, (Danish Legation) of 30-7-1915 to The Secretary of State, Foreign Office; 
Home Office, No. 295531 of 4-8-1915 to The Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office; For-
eign Office, No. 107665/15, Immediate, of 7-8-1915 to the Danish Minister; FO 382/70, Henry 
Crofter Lowther of 14-8-1915 to the honourable Edward Grey….. 
One of the “Parseval” type 
observation balloons that 
Frederik Moltke purchased 
from “A. Riedinger” in 1913 
with voluntary contribu-
tions and in 1915 as army 
purchasing officer. (his 
grandson’s photo collection)
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manufacturing ammunition. However, Major-General Albert Arendrup seems to 
have failed, and nothing seems to have happened.10 
Moltke arrived in late August and added impetus to the purchasing project. The 
Contraband Department of the Foreign Office noted on 27 August that “a certain 
Count Moltke” had already made contact regarding the purchase of ammunition. 
The department noted that “the French have asked us not to facilitate such supplies 
at the moment, in view of certain intrigues of their own.” On 2 September Count 
Castenskiold wanted information about whom Moltke should contact. However, 
when Castenskiold repeated the request on 16 September, the desk officer noted 
two days later that Moltke “has already established relations with the Admiralty”. 
This probably referred to Stagg, and reinforces the idea that the two men had met 
previously. The Foreign Secretary replied on 23 September that Moltke now had 
contacts with all the British Government departments relevant for his work.11
10  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, A. Material, Gen.major Nørresø 1905-1921, 
Pk. 1, includes all key documents in relation to the purchasing missions. Nothing is added to 
the initial directive to Arendrup: “Afskrift of 4-5-1915 Kjære Herr General (with a purchasing 
list) 
11  TNA. FO 382/70, War Office, No. 0158/256 of 8-4-1915 to The Under Secretary of State, For-
eign Office; Foreign Office, No. 34057/15, Confidential Cypher telegram No. 128 of 9-4-1915 to 
Sir H. Lowther; Cypher, Sir H. Lowther, No. 500, Confidential of 19-5-1915; The Under Secre-
tary of State, Foreign Office, of 27-5-1915 to the Director of Military Operations; Contraband 
Dept. E.P. of 27-8-1915 to (War Dept.); (Danish Minister) of 2-9-1915 to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs; Danish Minister) of 16-9-1915 to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 
note by “S.G.” of 18-9-1915 on No. 133366 of 17-9-1915; Sir Edward Grey of 23-9-1915 to the 
Danish Minister.
Moltke’s enthusiastic boss, the Danish Director 
of Ordnance, General Nørresø, in 1917. (RA)
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In September to November 1915 the Danish Social-Liberal government was 
openly criticised by the conservative and liberal opposition for neglecting nation-
al defence, and the Defence Minister had chosen to make certain concessions. 
He approved the construction of the “Tune Position” at the foot of the North-
East Zealand peninsula creating a forward defence of the capital and making it 
more likely that the garrisons on Zealand outside Copenhagen would be able to 
reach the fortress in case of a German landing. The defence minister also gave the 
Army Technical Corps and Fortress Artillery Commanders permission to try to 
get modern heavy field artillery for the fortress as well as to fill the ammunition 
stocks by import and production.12 
Building-up the ammunition stocks depended on the energy and efficiency of 
the purchasing missions to the U.S. and England, and Moltke’s energy and social 
profile made him the key person in the effort. On 20 June 1916, a week after the 
meeting and a short time before Moltke’s departure from London, Major-General 
Martin Nielsen Nørresø, the Danish Army Ordnance Director and commander 
of the Army Technical Corps, gave his description of Moltke’s achievements dur-
ing his 11 months in London: He had “proven to have an extraordinary ability 
to find the goods required, get export licences, facilitate insurance and dispatch to 
Denmark, etc. The Corps considered Moltke irreplaceable under the present condi-
tions…” 
To underline his point the General attached the long list of the wares and ma-
terial for army and naval authorities that Moltke had been able to get through the 
British blockade since 1 January 1916. He continued: “The demands have been 
growing continuously, and as … (Moltke) until that day had been able to get ex-
port licences for nearly everything needed, it would cause major damage to the ar-
my’s (and to some extent also the navy’s ) ability to get key supplies…” if Denmark 
should be unable to keep Moltke in place. 
Nørresø suggested to the Danish War Office that Moltke’s position was “con-
solidated and strengthened” by appointing him Military Attaché.13  
The Corps files for the period support the General’s views. Moltke had been 
incredibly diligent, proactive, persistent and effective from the time he arrived 
in London: looking for machine tools for shoemaking and ammunition produc-
tion, tin plate for hand grenade production, cartridges for hunting guns, soda, 
nickel and nickel salt, zinc plates, aluminium, copper plates, officer signal flutes, 
12  Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen, “Tunestillingen. Indenrigspolitisk middel og militær beskæf-
tigelse”, Henriette Buus (ed.); Første Verdenskrig ved Tunestillingen. Forsvarsvilje og hverdagsliv, 
(Greve 2010), pp. 73-78; Anders Osvald Thorkilsen, “Fra fem høns til én forsinket og forpjusket 
fjer. Tungt artilleri som lokkemad i P. Punchs kontrol med hæren”, Michael H. Clemmesen og 
Anders Osvald Thorkilsen (eds.), Mod fornyelsen af København forsvar 1915-18, (Copenhagen 
2009), pp. 87-114.
13  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, A. Material, Gen.major Nørresø 1905-1921, 
Pk. 1, Nørresø, Fortroligt, nr. 4774 af 20-6-1916 to Krigsministeriet. The quoted text translated 
into English by the author.
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carborundum slices, TNT, aerial camera, fibres for weapons cleaning, uniform 
cloth, swords for officers and NCOs, copper for dynamos, bismuth, antimony, 
crucibles for arms production, Farman aircraft, industrial grinding wheels, horse 
nose bags, Vaseline, etc. The list is included to counter the MI5 allegations that 
Moltke did not do the job he had been sent to do. He constantly reported about 
his purchases and their status on the way home. If he found products available in 
the U.S. he could not purchase in Great Britain, he sent information home so that 
Petersen in New York could take action.
Parallel with his formal purchasing work, he constantly reported as if he were 
a military attaché accredited to London. He sent information about the new steel 
helmets, accompanied by a drawing given to him by the Belgian Military Attaché, 
he reported on the debate about conscription and about the situation and for-
tunes of war, supported by paper clippings. He sent reports about how the French 
had organised an automobile field repair workshop and about what the British 
papers wrote about German observation balloons. He wrote about the news 
about the Russian early summer offensive, about use of nails to reinforce boots, 
about French ammunition production and about the publication of the “Times 
History of the War”.14  
Moltke had also sought and found other ways to support the development of 
the defence of his home country and capital. A short time after his arrival London 
came under bombardment from German Army and Navy airships, and his ob-
servations and guidance could help in the development of the artillery air defence 
of Copenhagen, in order to meet a similar threat.15 After developing their airships 
and tactics during attacks on the English coastal areas during the first half of 
1915, the two German armed services airship units shifted their focus to London 
from August. 
On 7 and 8 September the Germans finally succeeded in reaching London 
with the German Army airship S.L. 2 bombing the British capital on 1 September 
and the navy Zeppelin L.13 succeeding on 8 September. The next effective raid 
took place on a west to east flight route by the navy’s L.15 on 13 October.16 Moltke 
had been in London during the Zeppelin raids on 7 and 8 September. The first of 
these he had observed at close hand, and the same had happened on 13 October. 
Moltke warned after the first of these raids in mid-September that the German 
airships could “bring large amounts of explosives”. In case of war Copenhagen was 
likely to be bombed, and it was urgent and essential that a defence against the new 
14  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, C. Kopibøger, kommissioner & udland, 1914-
1920, pk. 2; C. Indgående skrivelser fra Krigsministeriet, 1915-1918, pk. 23.
15  Michael H. Clemmesen, “Overdækningen af fæstningen mod den nye trussel. Opbygningen af 
Københavns luftforsvar 1915-18”, Michael H. Clemmesen & Anders Osvald Thorkilsen, Mod 
fornyelsen af Københavns forsvar 1915-18, (Copenhagen 2009), pp. 12-19. 
16  Joseph Morris, The German Air Raids on Great Britain 1914-1918, (London 1925), pp. 53-63; 
Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat. A History of the German Naval Airship Divi-
sion, 1912-1919, (Atglen (PA) 1994), pp. 115-139.
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threat should be built up. He followed up with a cutting from the “Times” about 
the post-raid debate in the House of Commons, and he informed Copenhagen 
that Admiral Sir Percy Scott had been appointed commander of the London air 
defence. Scott, a gunnery specialist, had been retired before the war, but was re-
called to organise the defence by Arthur Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
on 11 September. According to Moltke, Scott had asked for French instructors to 
improve the work of the British air defence pilots. One of Lloyd’s directors had 
told Moltke that the damage from the raid was in excess of £1½-2 million.17
17  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, C. Kopibøger, kommissioner & udland, 1914-
1920, Pk. 2, Fragment visible on on: HtK af 18-9-1915 to Hr. Ritmester F. Greve Moltke, Danish 
Legation, London; the follow-up report on “Luftskibsangrebet på London” is visible on copy 
book p. 140 over note of 27-9-1915. The quoted text translated into English by the author.
What Moltke experienced: the 13 
October L.15 raid. (from: Robin-
son, The Zeppelin in Combat) 
and bomb damage at the corner 
of Exeter and Wellington Streets 
(from: the Osprey book London 
1914-17)
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He described his second observed raid on the next day, 14 October, after re-
porting about purchases for the Danish armament production that he had ar-
ranged from U.S. companies. Moltke had had dinner at St. James Club with an 
American diplomat and a Great Eastern Railway director when the anti-aircraft 
cannon in Green Park started firing. The railway man was a useful acquaintance, 
“as his company would normally be informed, when a Zeppelin raid is expected”. 
He thereafter observed that the raid started half past 9 p.m. and lasted fifteen 
minutes. The air defence artillery fired very few rounds, “probably because of the 
risk of damage from the falling shells”. Thereafter he had inspected the effects of 
the bombardment, including the damage to the Lyceum Theatre. He had been to-
gether with the American diplomat, who had called a car. Their diplomatic iden-
tity cards helped them through the police barriers. 
On the day after that raid Moltke had a meeting with Admiral Scott. It was 
apparently his second meeting with Sir Percy, as he reported that the Admiral’s 
former deputy, Commander Frederick Halahan, had been replaced by Captain 
L.S. Stansfeld. Moltke’s estimate why the guns had been relatively inactive on 13 
October was correct. Percy Scott considered the ammunition of the few available 
guns available more dangerous for the population than for the airships. Stansfeld 
informed Moltke that the raid had been carried out by three airships. One had 
Admiral Sir Percy Scott, who allowed 
Frederik Moltke access to his concerns 
and developing plans for the air defen-
ce of London (Rogers, The New York 
Times Current History: The European 
War (April–June 1915). Volume 3)
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reached central London, another had attacked the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, 
but caused only slight damage. The London attack had used both high explosive 
and incendiary bombs and killed 32 people. The main problem of hitting the air-
ships had been the inability of the controlling officers to estimate the altitude of 
their targets.18
At the same time as studying capital air defence problems, Moltke con-
tinued his constant and energetic efforts to purchase what the Danish Army 
needed, and he was also asked by Copenhagen to help send what Gunnar 
Petersen purchased in America back to Denmark. Petersen’s main task at the 
time was to buy 30 million 8 mm cartridges from “Maxim Munition Corpora-
tion” for the Danish Army, but he also bought chemicals, metal, etc. necessary 
for the Danish ammunition production. In mid- to late November the Army 
Technical Corps asked Moltke to get the U.S. purchases cleared for transit 
18  RA, Chefen for Hæren. Hærens tekniske Korps, Konstruktionsafdelingen, 1909-1943, A. Ind-
gående skrivelser, Flyvemateriel, Antiballonskyts 1911-1932, Ritmester F. Greve Moltke ved 
Gardehusarregimentet p.t. London, Fortroligt, of 14-10-1915 to Hærens tekniske Korps; A. 
Materiale, Gen. major Nørresø, 1905-1921, Pk.1, Kontorchef Kruse meddeles Telegram fra Ge-
sandten i Washington af 7-10-1015 med tilbud; Forsvarsministeren. Tilbud antages paa: … af 
9-10-1915.
Moltke’s map of Central London with the L.15 bomb hits he saw on 13 October 1915 in his 
contribution to the development of the air defence of Copenhagen against German bombard-
ment (RA)
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so they could get through the British blockade. The various goods had been 
prepared to sail from early October and the successful arrival of the goods in 
Denmark would make it possible to start production of the necessary extra 
rifle and field artillery ammunition. In what must be considered an element 
in the attempt to appease the Opposition, the Danish Defence Minister had 
approved the large purchase on 9 October. 
The British authorities were therefore informed that Moltke asked permis-
sion to have two sets of airplane parts (Gyro motors, propellers and tacho-
meters) and a large quantity of metal, etc. needed for ammunition production 
shipped through the blockade from America to Denmark. The shipment in-
cluded 80 tons of brass dies for home production of additional 8 mm car-
tridges, 42 tons of brass for 75 mm artillery cartridges, 20 tons of cupro-nickel 
caps, 6 tons of antimony ingots, 65 tons of lead ingots, 60 tons of lead wire, 
and 25 tons of “yellow metal” bars. 19 To understand the British reaction it is 
important to appreciate that the Contraband Department would do anything 
to prevent such shipments ending up in Germany.
Moltke’s contact in London, who was to get the goods from America through 
to Denmark was Richard M. Turner of the Foreign Office Contraband Depart-
ment. As we shall see, Turner was normally working in the Copenhagen Legation 
and was only in London as a result of accusations from Stagg. 
The Contraband Committee considered Moltke’s attempt unacceptably ir-
regular and referred the matter to the British Envoy in Copenhagen, as “it has 
hitherto been understood that Count Moltke was only acting for purchase in this 
country, and we were not aware that he was also making purchases in America”. 
The British apparently remained unaware that Moltke had not been shopping in 
the U.S. and that he was only acting under instruction from Copenhagen to help 
the purchasing officials in America. Moltke had been informed that the British 
Envoy in Copenhagen had been involved. The Committee considered that – as 
a minimum – the Danish Government should have approached the British Gov-
ernment through their accredited envoy, Count Castenskiold.20 
19  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, C. Kopibøger, kommissioner & udland, 1914-
1920, Pk. 2, HtK of 21?-11-1915 to Hr. Ritmester F. Greve Moltke, Danish Legation, London 
“Kaptain Gunnar Petersen i Amerika …”; HtK of 8-12-1915 to Hr. Kaptajn Gunnar Petersen, 
Kompagnichef ved 23’ Batallion, Danish Consulate, New York; Materielkontoret af 3-1-1916 til 
Konstruktionskontoret; HtK of 12-1-1916 to Hr. Kaptajn C. G. Petersen, Kompagnichef ved 23’ 
Batallion, Danish legation, New York making funds available..
20  TNA. FO 382/286, Count F. Moltke of 24-11-1915 to Richard M. Turner, Esq., Contraband De-
partment, Foreign Office; “Communicated by Mr Wallace”; “Goods for the Danish Government 
from U.S.” 25-11-1915; Cypher telegram to Sir H. Lowther, Foreign Office, No. 1454, of 27-11-
1915.
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Frank Stagg from 1910 until late 1915
Frank Noel Stagg was born in 1884 and joined the Royal Navy as a midshipman 
at 15 in winter 1900. He retired as a lieutenant at the end of 1908, probably to 
work in naval intelligence. He started Danish language studies in Copenhagen in 
1910. Notwithstanding his formal retirement, Stagg was promoted to Lieutenant 
Commander in spring 1914 and Commander on Armistice Day 1918.21 The Ger-
man Navy noted his presence and his activities at the end of his studies, where 
Stagg made a reconnaissance of Danish ports, apparently to evaluate their utility 
as torpedo boat bases. However, the Germans considered him too junior to have 
any role in the planning of major operations.22
After the formation of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI1c) in 1909, 
the new organisation started to build up networks in Denmark and Norway, but 
until 1913, Denmark remained a Naval Intelligence responsibility. Therefore it 
is logical that there are no records of relations between Stagg and the new or-
ganisation during his Copenhagen “studies”. He is reported to have moved from 
regular Naval Intelligence work to the new organisation in either autumn 1914 
or September 1915, and he seemed thereafter to have roles in both Denmark and 
Norway. During the war he worked out of London visiting the two states.23 
It must have been in the MI1c role that Stagg visited Copenhagen and Chris-
tiania in autumn 1915. During his visit in Copenhagen he had private meetings 
on 28 and 29 November with the Commanding Admiral, Vice-Admiral Otto Ko-
foed-Hansen. 
Stagg used his evening meeting on 29 November for disinformation similar in 
character to that which he gave to Moltke seven months later. He told the Admi-
ral that England wanted to help his country and would be willing to land a field 
army of 150.000 in Jutland with three days warning in case of a German invasion. 
At the same time the Royal Navy would dispatch pre-Dreadnought battleships, 
monitors, destroyers and submarines to assist the Danish Navy and be willing to 
place that force under the Admiral’s command. The unimpressed admiral replied 
that as long as the Royal Navy stayed away from the Baltic Sea there was little risk 
of a German invasion. The most likely reason for Stagg’s rather grotesque disin-
formation was that he would provoke the Admiral to leak information that could 
be used as intelligence about planned Danish reactions. Another possible reason 
was that Stagg wanted to reinforce any German fears of an offensive across the 
21  http://www.unithistories.com/officers/RN_officersS2.html (accessed 11-10-2014)
22  Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv (BAMA), RM/5/1614. A. 2269. IV, Berlin 11-10-1912, Zum Im-
mediatvortrag. O-Befehle 1912,‘Richtlinien für Verhalten unseres Seekriegsführung Dänemark 
gegenüber’.
23  For MI1c in Denmark, see: Keith Jeffery, The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, 
(London 2010) pp. 55, 87-89, 95, 97. Michael Smith: Six. A History of Britain’s Secret Intelligence 
Service, (London 2010), pp. 5-17, 20-36, 122-128. Jeffery gives the second date for Stagg’s trans-
fer from Naval Intelligence to MI1c: September 1915. The information that NID was responsi-
ble until 1913 is based on a comment from Richard Dunley during the editing of the article. 
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border towards the Kiel Canal. If so, Stagg failed as a credible source of informa-
tion. After the Stagg visit the German envoy to Copenhagen reassured Berlin that 
there was no substance behind rumours that British and Danish troops planned 
to invade the Duchy of Schleswig. The German decision-makers should listen to 
him, not to agents. 24 
In a third meeting on 3 November before Stagg departed for Christiania, the 
admiral emphasised to him that Denmark “had all to lose and England nothing to 
gain by a Royal Navy entry into the Baltic Sea or a landing in Jutland”. According 
to the admiral, Stagg had been surprised when he was informed that as an officer 
from a belligerent state he needed official permission to visit Denmark. Without 
it he would be interned.25
The Richard Turner affair
However, the main reason for Stagg’s visit was not to influence the Danish Com-
manding Admiral or seek information about Danish defence or policies. Nicho-
las Lambert has described in “Planning Armageddon” how the British authori-
ties in 1915 and especially during the autumn, had finally agreed to intensify the 
economic warfare against Germany. It should take place by gaining more con-
trol over exports from the three Nordic States and the Netherlands to Germany. 
The various trade intelligence elements in Whitehall had gained an ever clearer 
picture of the amount of contraband that reached the enemy with license from 
the Trade Attachés of the British Legation of neutral capitals. Captain Montague 
Consett, the brilliant, but often indiscreet and rude British Naval Attaché accred-
ited to the Nordic States, drove the attempt to close this hole in the blockade. He 
did so in a close correspondence with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain 
Reginald Hall. In September 1915 the Dutch had found a politically acceptable, 
voluntary way to control export to Germany using the self-interest of the private 
business associations whose members needed imports through the blockade to 
keep their business alive. On 16 November, immediately after Stagg’s visit, the 
Copenhagen Merchant’s Guild and the Danish Industrial Association assumed 
responsibility for managing imported contraband items. Nobody seemed to be 
concerned that these two organisations were neither suited nor motivated to 
manage imports for the Danish armed forces such as the purchases of Moltke in 
England and Petersen in the U.S. 
Stagg had probably been sent to Copenhagen to inspect and energise the 
blockade work of the Legation to match the new development. The way he did 
so was in line with the naval attaché’s muscular approach, and the result was that 
24  RA. AA Pk. 375 læg 13: Rantzau’s Despatch to Berlin of (?) November 1915.
25  O. Kofoed-Hansen, Daglige optegnelser under krigen, Tage Kårsted (ed.), Flåden under 1. Ver-
denskrig. O. Kofoed-Hansen og V. Jøhnkes optegnelser, (Aarhus 1976); Michael H. Clemmesen, 
Den lange vej mod 9. april. Historien om de fyrre år før den tyske operation mod Norge og Dan-
mark i 1940, (Odense 2010), pp. 131f.
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Stagg lost the possibility of returning to Denmark during the war.26 Consett’s own 
lack of tact meant that he was replaced as Naval Attaché to Denmark in summer 
1917.27 
On 26 October, before travelling to Copenhagen from Norway, Stagg sent a let-
ter to a London contact, the former Copenhagen Consul Lionel Liddell28 whom 
he must have known from his study time in Copenhagen. Stagg asked Liddell to 
persuade the Foreign Office (preferably the Assistant Under Secretary Sir Eyre 
Crowe) to insist that the Envoy in Copenhagen reassert control over his Lega-
tion’s licensing of contraband for export. The consul, Robert Erskine, was con-
stantly being overruled by the Commercial Attaché, Richard Turner. Turner was 
“a perfect danger to our country and the sooner he is cleared out of it the better”. 
He had overruled the attempts of the group of consuls in Bergen to stop export to 
Germany, and complaints about Turner’s work had been repeated in Christiania. 
Everybody “is spitting blood about him”. If necessary Liddell should go through 
the intelligence officer Edward Calthrop of MI3, the War Office Intelligence De-
partment, to get results. 
When Stagg had returned to London in mid-November, he repeated his angry 
accusations against Turner in a meeting of the War Trade Advisory Committee 
during the discussion of the new agreements with the Danish organisations about 
voluntary control. Turner reacted on 19 November in a letter to Eyre Crowe to 
suggest “a strict enquiry into the whole matter” both to clear himself and to mini-
mise the risk of “similar difficulties” in the future. Turner ended by noting that he 
would take Crowe’s advice, and suggested a quick investigation as his continued 
absence from Copenhagen was putting strain on the legation.
Eyre Crowe referred the matter immediately to Lord Robert Cecil noting that 
Stagg’s accusations were against the “honour and integrity of our whole legation at 
Copenhagen”. Both Consett and Stagg should be asked to put their accusations 
in writing. These should be dealt with by the Foreign Office and Admiralty to-
gether. If the allegations proved to be without foundation, “the two naval officers 
should be seriously dealt with, and that more particularly Lieut. Stagg’s employment 
in Scandinavia should cease”. The Envoy to Norway should be asked discreetly 
to control his subordinates. Robert Cecil noted his agreement on the same day, 
26  Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon. British Economic Warfare and the First World War, 
(Cambridge (Mass), 2012), especially: pp. 396-398, 463-475. Lambert concludes from Consett’s 
correspondence with Hall that Consett is also Cumming’s MI1c-co-ordinator for Scandinavia; 
for the total Northern Neutrals’ export to Germany see: Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Enger-
man, Naval Blockades in Peace and War. An Economic History Since 1750, (Cambridge 2006), 
pp. 206-214; see also: Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany 1914-1919, 
(London 2004); M.W.W.P. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918). An account of 
the transactions by which Germany during the Great War was able to obtain supplies prior to her 
collapse under the pressure of economic forces, (London 1928), pp. 133-140. 
27  Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. April, pp. 286-291.
28  For Liddell’s pre-war role: Richard Dunley, “‘Not Intended to Act as Spies’: The Consular Intel-
ligence Service in Denmark and Germany 1906-14”, The International History Review, 2014.
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19 November.29 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Hall, was informed 
about Stagg’s behaviour, and the Envoy to Norway, Mansfeldt Findlay, was dis-
creetly asked on 20 November to control his “over-zealous subordinates”. Findlay 
replied two days later that his only subordinate was Consett, and the Naval At-
taché denied being involved in any accusations against the integrity of the Co-
penhagen Legation. Crowe realised that his first communication had been un-
clear and sent a follow-up telegram on 29 November. Now he made clear that the 
source of the trouble had been Stagg, “who appears to have been acting the part of 
secret informer to the Admiralty”, and he repeated the Lieutenant Commander’s 
accusations against Turner.30
By now the accusations had leaked – or been leaked – to the press. On 20 
November the “Daily Mail” published articles attacking the British legation in 
Copenhagen.31
On 23 November Robert Cecil had sought information about the substance of 
the problem from Captain Hall, but in vain. Both the First Lord of the Admiralty 
and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had been contacted by Hall and 
were informed about the case.32 
After Hall had been involved, Stagg realised that he had a problem and sought 
the support of Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, who had participated in the 13 No-
vember meeting. Here Stagg twice denied having attacked the “personal integrity” 
of Turner, and he could not understand how anybody could get that impression. 
Slade wrote immediately to Crowe that he “did not think” that Stagg had intend-
ed any personal attack on Turner. Nobody could refer to Stagg’s letter to Liddell 
because it had been a personal communication.33 However, the Contraband De-
partment found that Stagg’s explanation and apology was “very incomplete”, and 
Robert Cecil agreed. 34
It was at this stage of the investigation of Turner’s work when the contraband 
authorities had to deal with Moltke’s effort to secure the large purchase of met-
al, etc. for ammunition production from the U.S.to Denmark. Turner had been 
Moltke’s contact in the Foreign Office Contraband Department, and his activi-
ties had been considered irregular because the British were unaware that he was 
29  TNA. FO 382/340, Stagg’s letter of 26-10-1915 to Liddell; Robert Cecil of 14-11-1915 to “My 
dear Hopwood”; Richard Turner, Contraband Department letter of 19-11-1915 to “Dear Sir 
Eyre”; Note “Handling of Contraband Questions in Denmark: Suggest enquiry” No. 174920 of 
19-11-1915.
30  TNA. FO 382/340, Crowe, Draft of 20-11-1915 to Findlay; Findlay telegram of 22-11-1915; 
Crowe, Private og 29-11-1915 to “My dear Findlay”. 
31  TNA. ADM 12/1539A. Note: “Newspaper Attacks on British Legation at Copenhagen”. Articles 
published by the Daily Mail Nov 20.
32  TNA. FO 382/340, Bryan B. Buckley of 23-11-1915 to “Dear Mr. Locock”.
33  TNA. FO 382/340, Stagg letter of 23-11-1915 to Slade; Slade letter of 24-11-1915 to Crowe.
34  TNA. FO 382/340, Notes on “No. 177144 of 24-11-1915 “Handling of Contraband Questions in 
Denmark”; Robert Cecils’ note of 24-11-1915 on No. 179637 “Handling of Contraband Ques-
tions in Denmark” .
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simply acting under directive from Copenhagen. Moltke was blamed because he 
was the one making the request. By using the accused Turner (whom he probably 
knew from Copenhagen) as his contact, Moltke hardly helped himself.  
On 29 November Stagg wrote another apology, but he basically repeated what 
he had written to Slade some days earlier. He denied to have made any charges 
“against Mr. Turner’s personal honour. The statement I did make was that there was 
a lamentable lack of British Control over imports into and exports from Denmark”. 
Turner was just part of a system that did not work in the interest of the British 
Empire. The lack of control had probably already cost the Allied forces thousands 
of lives.35 On that day Crowe informed Findlay that Stagg’s accusations against 
the Copenhagen Legation had reached both the City and “Danish gentlemen of 
high social position, who enjoy the personal confidence of Sir E. Grey”. The talk 
had to stop.36 On 3 December Stagg asserted to the leader of the enquiry that he 
had not withdrawn accusations against Turner, because he had never made any.37 
This left the enquiry open-ended and the matter was referred to Robert Cecil for 
decision. On 7 December Cecil concluded that Stagg’s accusations were “wholly 
devoid of foundation”, and that he was “unable or unwilling” to deliver documen-
tation. He hoped “that Commander Stagg will not be further employed in the Pub-
lic Service, at any rate in Scandinavia”. The next day Turner was informed that he 
had been cleared, and on 9 December the legations in Copenhagen, Christiania 
and Stockholm were informed that Stagg “had preferred not to make the attempt” 
to document the charges, and Turner would now return to his work in Copenha-
gen. On 10 December another telegram supplemented by noting that “If Lieuten-
ant-Commander Stagg’s present performance is a fair sample of secret agent work, 
that only strengthens the conviction … that Admiralty receives many statements on 
subject of contraband trade which cannot be substantiated as well as some which 
have not foundation in fact”. Cecil and Crowe did not seem to appreciate that as 
secret agent Stagg could not support his accusations and conclusions with evi-
dence as this would expose his sources. 
On 25 December the Admiralty concluded that Stagg “should not be allowed to 
return to Denmark in any official capacity”.38 The decision did not block his return 
as secret agent. By then Stagg already had another problem with Captain Hall: the 
disappearance of the air defence artillery plan. 
35  TNA. FO 382/340, Frank N. Stagg, Admiralty of 29-11-1915 to Ernest M. Pollock.
36  TNA. FO 382/340, Crowe, Private of 29-11-1915 to “My dear Findlay”.
37  TNA. FO 382/340, Frank N. Stagg, Admiralty of 3-12-1915 to Ernest M. Pollock.
38  TNA. FO 382/340, Ernest M. Pollock, No. 188193 of 6-12-1915 to Lord Robert Cecil; Robert 
Cecil of 7-12-1915 to the Secretary of the Admiralty; Sir E. Gray of 8-12-1915 to “Dear Mr. 
Turner”; F.O. Confidential telegram No. 1516 f 9-12-1915 to Sir H. Lowther (Repeated to Chris-
tiania and Stockholm); F.O. No. 2003 of 10-12-1915 to Sir H. Lowther; Admiralty, Secret, No. 
49132/15 of 25-12-1915 to the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office.
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Stagg and Moltke in London autumn 1915 to summer 1916
As already noted, Stagg’s contact visits to Denmark and Norway in autumn 1915 
are likely to have been linked to his transfer to Mansfield Smith-Cumming’s MI1c, 
but no matter which intelligence service he worked for then, his professional fo-
cus and knowledge seemed to be narrowly linked to blockade issues. This would 
explain why his remarks both in 1915 and later in 1916 seemed disconnected 
from Admiralty policies in relation to Denmark, which was to maintain status 
quo with the country unoccupied and avoid actions that might provoke German 
reaction. A wish not to provoke an unwanted German reaction may be why the 
Royal Navy cancelled its planned ”sweeps” into Kattegat three times in 1916 – in 
April, May and August.39 Considering the very nervous German Navy reactions 
to the Operation “A.G.” raid in early November 1917 and the mining Operation 
“A.H.” in mid-April 1918, the cancellation was justified if the British wanted to 
maintain status quo.40
According to the MI5 memorandum of 17 June 1916, Moltke had been 
introduced to Stagg by the Secretary of the Danish Legation – the envoy’s 
deputy – Count Eduard Reventlow41 on his arrival in London, “saying that 
Count Moltke was interested in anti-aircraft matters”.42 That information prob-
ably came from Stagg who had no good reason to inform the MI5 case officer 
of any previous knowledge of Moltke from his time as an intelligence officer in 
Copenhagen. The counter-intelligence memorandum noted that Reventlow had 
connection with Eva de Bournonville, “the convicted spy”. Reventlow had been 
her contact in the legation after she failed to get employment as a copyist there 
in September 1915. He had been asked to help her keeping the money she had 
brought, acting as her bank giving her cash when she needed it. Bournonville was 
soon caught as a German spy, sentenced to death and later had her conviction 
changed to life imprisonment.43 
Stagg brought Moltke into contact with Sir Percy Scott’s organization, and the 
Dane was given full access to the air defence plans and allowed to work “two or 
three days” in the Admiralty. In addition Moltke had been given access to a large 
part of the anti-aircraft defence units “as if he had been accredited representative 
of an Allied nation”. An Entente ally is probably what Frederik Moltke – like other 
39  TNA. SDM 137/1938; ADM 137/1881. List of contents of Home Fleets files in ’H.F. 0022’
40  Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, (2010), Chapters 21, 23, 45.
41  Count Eduard Vilhelm Sophus Christian Reventlow was a known friend of the Allies, and he 
was made Permanent Under-Secretary of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1922 by the 
pro-Allied liberal Government. He was to end his career as envoy to London in 1940, when 
the German occupation of Denmark made this impossible: http://www.denstoredanske.dk (ac-
cessed 12-10-2014).
42  TNA. FO 371/3361, p. 345. ”re Count Frederick MOLTKE”.
43  RA. Udenrigsministeriet, Fortrolige skabssager (efteraflevering II, 1993), 13-Dan. 22/19, Pk 17; 
Det Kongelige Gesandtskab, London, No. 1039 ”Frøken Eva Bournonville. Ges. Telegram No. 
1083 af den 20’ d.M.” of 22-11-1915 to Udenrigsministeriet. 
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Danish army officers – considered himself to be, even if the geostrategic misfor-
tune of his country made active participation in a war against Germany suicidal.
However, in December 1915 it was discovered that “an Anti-Aircraft map, 
showing the anti-aircraft defences of London” had disappeared from the Admiralty 
room where Moltke had been working because of “a series of somewhat unfortu-
nate omissions on the part of the officers concerned”, meaning primarily Stagg. 
The discovery that the plan was missing and that Moltke might have been re-
sponsible must have taken place in early December, because on 15 December the 
Danish envoy complained that “lately”, what Castenskiold described as “Scotland 
Yard”, had been making inquiries about Moltke at the Danish Consulate General. 
Moltke had notified his War Office contact. However on 11 December he had 
been visited by two alleged police inspectors who wanted information about a 
person who had been in possession of Moltke’s visiting card. Later Moltke had 
obtained information that the real purpose had been to inspect his flat “to obtain 
some information as to his position”. His War Office contact had advised him that 
the Legation should raise the matter on Moltke’s behalf. The Foreign Office asked 
the Home Office to look into the matter.44 The Home Office report from 10 Feb-
ruary 1916 made clear that no police inspectors had visited Moltke. Neither the 
Metropolitan Police nor the City of London Police had been involved, and the 
Home Secretary could not do more until he had further information. The reply 
was given to the Danish Envoy on 15 February. 45 The British left it to Moltke and 
Castenskiold to guess from where the “inconvenient” visit had come. 
It did not seem to occur to anybody in MI5 or the Admiralty that it would 
have been both unnecessary and stupidly counter-productive to actually steal the 
plan. The moment it was realised that the plan was stolen and probably in enemy 
hands, its tactical information would lose much of its relevance, as guns could re-
deploy to new positions. If Moltke had indeed been a spy, he should have limited 
himself to noting the fixed gun locations and calibre, the search-light positions 
and the deployment and plans for use of the mobile weapons. With the limited 
strength of the London air defence artillery organisation in autumn 1915, an in-
terested professional such as Moltke would have been able to memorise all rele-
vant information in an hour or so.
During their investigation British intelligence had discovered that Moltke’s 
brother was the Danish envoy to Berlin. He was “stated to be very pro-German”, 
and Frederik Moltke’s wife was “constantly” visiting her brother-in-law in the 
German capital. At the same time Frederik Moltke’s “pecuniary circumstances” 
appeared to have improved dramatically. His “expenditure was lavish and remark-
able”. 
44  TNA. FO 372/660, No. 191759 of 15-12-1915 ”Count Moltke”.
45  TNA. FO 371/827, No. 26903 of 10-2-1916 ”Inconvenience caused to Count Moltke by the 
police authorities”.
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In fact there is absolutely no indication that Frederik Moltke’s half-brother in 
Berlin, Carl Moltke, was pro-German. He had been a naval officer until 1898, 
when he changed career to the diplomacy, and during his naval career he had 
been seconded to the French Navy. He had married an American in 1907, and his 
regular correspondence with his mother shows a Danish patriot worried about 
the plight of the Danish minority in Schleswig. When he became Foreign Min-
ister in the first Social-Democratic government in 1924, he made clear that he 
disagreed with its pacifist security policy.46 Frederik Moltke’s grandson finds it 
highly unlikely that his grandmother made frequent visits to Carl Moltke during 
the war years, as she took care of his then very young father back in Denmark.47 
The 17 June 1916 report pointed out that Frederik Moltke “was constantly in 
and out of the War Office, and cultivated the acquaintance of Naval and Military 
Officers, inviting them out to dinner, and generally appearing as if he was endeav-
ouring to obtain information”. It failed to see or accept that what Moltke did was 
46  RA. Moltke, Carl, diplomat, og hustru. 1884-1948, Breve og personlige papirer, Breve 1916-
1921, pk. 7; http://www.denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon/Samfund,_jura_og_
politik/Myndigheder_og_politisk_styre/Diplomat/Carl_Moltke (accessed 28-10-2014).
47  Henrik Moltke, 16-11-2014.
Count Carl Moltke, the Danish Mi-
nister in Berlin since autumn 1912, 
who was accused of being “very 
pro-German” and working for 
German intelligence with his half-
brother in London and his sister-
in-law. (Danish Royal Library)
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what any de facto service attaché or any other diplomat – neutral or allied – was 
meant to do. 
 MI5 had investigated whether Moltke had actually purchased munition in 
England, but found that he had only placed an order for six horse ambulanc-
es. Considering the Danish officer’s intensive purchasing offensive, buying from 
a large number of English companies and constantly engaging the contraband 
authorities, it is possible that the counter-intelligence organisation had already 
made up its mind that it wanted to get rid of Moltke and tailored its report to 
support that conclusion. 
As to the information about Fredrik Moltke’s wife and half-brother in Ber-
lin, the lack of accurate information about his purchasing activities highlight the 
weakly researched character of the memorandum. Before Moltke left for Eng-
land, he had been active in the expensive ballooning sport and had sponsored 
the Danish aviation pioneer, Ellehammer. Frederik Moltke is not likely to have 
had problems financing his hosting of contacts in London Even if we can’t be 
100 per cent certain, the counter-intelligence service had apparently returned 
empty-handed from its investigation and search in winter as no information was 
included in the arguments in the 17. June memorandum, The purpose of that 
document – to support a decision to get Moltke out of the country – means that 
it must be considered a summary of the Moltke MI5 file still not available to his-
torians. Therefore it is likely to employ all arguments supporting the notion that 
he was a spy.    
Warnings were issued to the various departments, “but it is obviously impossi-
ble to warn individual officers until after their intimacy with a person who is sus-
pect has been discovered”. The substance of the latter sentence is rather strange. Of 
course a nation at war can forbid professional and social contact with a suspected 
spy, even with a charming nobleman such as Frederik Moltke. 
From early December 1915 the British contraband authorities worked to limit 
Moltkes purchasing activities. It had established that crucibles from the U.S. to 
Denmark should move via a British port, meaning that the Danes had to ob-
tain export licenses from London. This became difficult due to “lack of crucibles 
among England’s allies”. In Moltke’s and Nørresø’s opinion the general misunder-
standing in December about the imports from the U.S. to Denmark had arisen 
because his list had reached the Contraband Department before the Envoy Cas-
tenskiold’s note had been sent. 
During the spring of 1916 Moltke had continued his purchasing activities, 
successfully obtaining export licenses for goods directly relevant for arms pro-
duction, bypassing the effective control system established locally between the 
self-interested Danish merchants and industrialists and the now more disciplined 
British Legation in Copenhagen. However, by 8 May 1916 the British had de-
manded that all Moltke’s export licences should be processed by their Copenha-
gen legation. This would mean that “the English authorities with whom (Moltke) 
had effective routine relations, and whose goodwill in relation to Denmark had often 
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been proven, would be replaced with others”. The Foreign Office and the Copen-
hagen legation would take over, meaning that the earlier smooth action would 
cease. General Nørresø naturally objected to the idea that the defence production 
demands would be limited to what the private Copenhagen Merchant’s Guild and 
the private Danish Industrial Association considered relevant and necessary. He 
reacted, as any normal state authority would do.48    
As the British already had and kept full control over what was actually licensed 
for export to Denmark, the changed procedures do not seemed linked to whether 
he was a spy or not. They must first and foremost be seen as an effective attempt to 
limit and control exports of contraband goods to Denmark, and as long as Moltke 
was in London, he seemed to be able to charm a passage through the blockade. It 
is not likely that Nørresø or Moltke became aware of MI5’s suspicion. If so, neither 
would have believed it could be serious. Nørresø’s proposal on 20 June that Moltke 
should be appointed Military Attaché to ease his work underlines this.
Moltke left England via Newcastle-Bergen and arrived in Copenhagen on 26 
July. As was typical of him, he used his travel message to inform the Army Tech-
nical Corps about his latest successful – and last – British export license: for horse 
nose bags. When Moltke was sent to the U.S., after two weeks in Denmark, the 
reason given to Captain Gunnar Petersen was that the new British diplomatic 
procedures meant that it was a better idea to move Moltke to America. He would 
depart for New York on 10 August. He would gradually take over Petersen’s work 
as the production of rifle ammunition progressed.49
When Moltke had approached Stagg on 13 June with the request for a meet-
ing, the latter could get two birds with one stone. Building on the existing suspi-
cions of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who had been “disturbed by … Count 
MOLTKE’S activities” and MI5 Stagg could save himself by removing the stigma 
resulting from the loss of the map.50 At the same time as getting Moltke out of the 
country he would be helping the British authorities gain more effective control 
over exports to Denmark and undoing the damage done as part of the Turner 
affair.
The effects
The worsening Danish defence situation winter-spring 1916
The disinformation that Stagg gave to Moltke on 14 June to trap him in the eyes 
of the security agent had thereafter been reinforced by the Danish envoy in his 
48  RA, Chefen for Hæren. Hærens tekniske Korps,; A. Materiale, Gen. major Nørresø, 1905-1921, 
Pk.1, Udenrigsministeriet, 1’ Departement, Journal Nr. 13. Q. 18 of 21-7-1916 to Krigsminister-
iet; Nørresø, No. 3639 of 8-5-1916 to Krigsministeriet. The quoted text translated into English 
by the author.
49  RA, Chefen for Hæren. Hærens tekniske Korps, Hærens tekniske Korps of 9-8-1916 to Kaptain 
C.G. Petersen, Dansk Konsulat, New York.
50  TNA, FO 371/3361, ff. 345-347
From a London Working Lunch to the Danish summer 1916 war scare   145
despatch the following day. The information nourished an existing panic in the 
Danish Army.
The deployment in late summer 1915 of additional British submarines into the 
Baltic Sea had brought about the worst German violation of Danish neutrality 
to date when German torpedo boats destroyed the stranded submarine E.13 in 
Danish territorial waters in the Flint Channel between Denmark and Sweden. 
Another such incident was likely to lead to exchange of fire between Danish and 
German naval vessels, and Admiral Kofoed-Hansen was eager to take steps that 
would minimise the risks of that happening.
The opportunity to do so came soon. The success of the growing number of 
British submarines operating from Russian bases against both German warships 
and iron ore ships off the Swedish eastern coast led to a firm German decision 
to prevent further submarine deployment through the Danish Straits. From Sep-
tember 1915 to May 1916 the Sound was closed by an ever increasing number 
of mine and net barriers, and the German minefield in the Great Belt was simi-
larly strengthened and supplemented with a barrier between the Danish island of 
Falster and the German coast that also hampered access to the Kiel Bight. Both 
Sweden and Denmark had been challenged by the British submarine operations, 
and both participated in closing the Sound because this would reduce the risk of 
further awkward or dangerous incidents.
However, the combination of minefields at the southern end of the Sound 
had one secondary effect: it undermined the joint Danish army-navy plans for 
defence against a German sea landing in Køge Bay. A force landed here might 
quickly capture the narrow waist of the Northeast-Zealand peninsula between 
that bay and Roskilde Fiord. Thereby the withdrawal of forces from the southern 
and western parts of the island of Zealand would be blocked making the planned 
use of Copenhagen Fortress as the national redoubt impossible because of lack 
of forces. The anti-submarine barriers also blocked the planned deployment of 
Danish coastal submarines from the Copenhagen Naval Base to Køge Bay, where 
they were to attack the German landing force transports. During spring 1916 the 
situation worsened when the German Navy built up a powerful guard squadron 
just south of the barriers. It included a pre-Dreadnought battleship, an airplane 
tender, torpedo boats and a significant number of lighters. The force was clearly 
visible from the Danish Army coastal fortifications.51
The other development since mid-1915 that worsened the defence situation 
was the reduction of the army Neutrality Guard in Zealand (mentioned earli-
er) established to protect the Fortress against a coup attack and give security to 
a mobilisation. The main worry of the Commanding General had always been 
to ensure that half of the Zealand field army regiments, which had their mo-
bilisation places and depots in provincial towns on the island, would reach the 
51  Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april. Historien om de fyrre år før den tyske opera-
tion mod Norge og Danmark i 1940, (Odense 2010), pp.125-137.
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Fortress safely and in time. These regiments had their initial deployment guard-
ing the island’s western, southern and south-eastern coasts. Until the neutrality 
guard reductions their safe withdrawal to Copenhagen could be achieved by a 
forward deployment of the regular Copenhagen regiments – the other half of the 
Zealand field army – to secure the peninsula’s Bay-Fiord “waist”. Until the reduc-
tions approved by the King to achieve government support for the ammunition 
purchasing missions the Copenhagen reserve regiments protected the Fortress 
against a coup. With the reductions the reserve regiments had been demobilised 
and the Commanding General had been forced to move regular regiments from 
the “waist” to guard his Fortress.
However in November 1915 under critical pressure from the pro-defence op-
Trace showing the Danish Navy’s observations of the supplementary mine and net barriers 
placed in the Sound south of the island of Amager (upper centre) in March-April 1916. Here-
by the deployment route of the Danish submarines into Køge Bay was considered blocked. 
The German composite squadron that was stationed to protect the barrier was placed just 
south of it. (RA)
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position the Government authorised a different solution to his problem: a field 
fortified line across the “waist“ that could support the withdrawing field army 
regiments from the Zealand provincial garrisons back to Copenhagen. The large 
excavation and construction work started immediately and proceeded through 
winter and spring 1916.52
The arrival and high visibility of the German guard squadron with its battle-
ship artillery and its transport lighters and observation hydroplanes was already 
a serious concern before the report of the lunch conversation between Moltke and 
Stagg had arrived from London. The lighters might hold troops that could land 
and capture the eastern sector of the Tune Position or the island of Amager with 
no warning, supported by the heavy guns of the battleship. If that was achieved, 
it would undermine the defence of the Fortress. From 3 June an army division 
headquarters had therefore been made responsible for co-ordinating the guard-
52  Ibid., pp.139-153; Michael H. Clemmesen, Tunestillingen. Indenrigspolitisk middel og militær 
beskæftigelse, Henriette Buus (ed.), Første Verdenskrig ved Tunestillingen. Forsvarsvilje og hver-
dagsliv, (Greve 2010); Martin Jespersen & Jens Ole Christensen (eds.), Københavns Befæstning. 
Til Fædrelandets Forsvar, (Copenhagen 2012).
Trace from March 1916 showing the status in the construction of the “Tune Position”. Note that 
the position is without flank positions defending the coast. Such coastal defence positions were 
established during the summer, but the influence of Stagg’s warning is an open question. (RA)
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ing and defence of the Køge Bay coast, and on 9 June followed a decree that 
raised the local combat readiness level. The next day the responsible division 
noted that the most urgent issue was the blocking and defence of Køge Harbour 
against a coup.53
Uncertain effects of the mid-June reports: the army
With the semi-panic about the threat to the Køge Bay area since early June, it is 
difficult to separate out the impact of the information from London as opposed 
to the broader reaction to heightened tensions. It is possible that Frederik Moltke 
cabled the information from Stagg that the British could start an operation to 
enter the Baltic within three months directly to the Danish General Staff Duty 
Officer in line with the procedure established in 1911, where he had become re-
sponsible for receiving urgent intelligence messages and diplomatic cables out-
side normal working hours.54 If so, the first reaction might have been the request 
to the navy on 14 June to start nightly patrols along the coast from Copenhagen 
to Køge. Patrols using either torpedo or patrol craft started two days later.55 The 
Mosede coastal battery close to where the Tune Position reached Køge Bay had 
been under construction since 1914, but it had not yet been completed. On 18 
June the British secret agent BRUTUS, a Dane, reported after a conversation with 
the King at the Skaw two days earlier and Danish officials accompanying him that 
both the King and the military authorities considered the situation “extremely se-
rious”, especially because of the warships and the large number of lighters (“200”) 
that the Germans had assembled south of Saltholm in the Sound.56 On 19 June 
the battery received a confidential instruction stating its mission: to counter lan-
ding attempts together with the navy and in cooperation with Tune Position field 
artillery. When resisting a force already ashore, the battery would be subordi-
nated to the infantry division made responsible for the Tune Position eleven days 
earlier.57 It is very difficult to directly link these steps to a possible early warning 
from London as they may just have been a natural continuation of the ongoing 
improvement of coastal defence readiness, however the information will undoub-
tedly have added to the atmosphere of panic. Likewise it is impossible to prove 
that the warning inspired the orders given on 20 June to expand the infantry po-
53  RA. Generalstabens Operationssektions Indkomne Sager 1916, Pk. 6; GST F-SEK Indkomne Sa-
ger 1978-1951 Pk. A. 23, Chefen for 1’ Division, Fortroligt B. No. 116; 117; 118 of 03-06-1916; 
No. 126 of 10-06-1916 til Overkommandoen; 2’ Division, Fortroligt, A.B.M. Indkomne Sager 
No.196; Overkommandoen, Fortroligt, Nr. 371 of 09-06-1916 to 2’ Division.
54  Michael H. Clemmesen, Det lille land før den store krig, (2012), p. 166.
55  RA. Flaadens Overkommando, Indkomne sager, ’Direktiver og Ordrer for den udrustede Flåde’, 
Flaadens Overkommando, Fortrolig O. Nr. 527-528 of 16-06-1916 to Chefen for den flydende 
Defension.
56  TNA. FO 371/2754, CX445, 18-6-1916 ”Following from BRUTUS, June 16th, at SKAW…”
57  RA. Generalstabens Fæstningssektion 1878-1951 Pk. A 23, Kystartilleriregimentet, Fortroligt, 
No. 2540 of 19-06-1916 to Overkommandoen.
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sitions in front of the Copenhagen Fortress Northern Front, or to the decision 
on that same day to double the infantry force on the south coast of Amager just 
north of the German squadron. When the Commanding General instructed the 
Artillery General one week later to make certain that light machineguns of the 
Mosede Battery could be used against airplanes, the order was most probably 
triggered by the sight of the German airplane tender visible from the battery, 
and the same applies to the Commanding General’s directive of 29 June for the 
organisation of the Tune Position air defence.58
Possible and certain effects of the mid-June reports: the navy
It is far easier to trace how the information influenced the Danish Navy. Count 
Grevenkop-Castenskiold’s despatch had reached Copenhagen on 22 June, and 
Admiral Kofoed-Hansen immediately discussed its content with Herluf Zahle, 
the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Admiral 
still did not consider it likely that the attack would come, but on the other hand 
he could not rule out that England be foolish enough to attempt an entry. If it 
happened, he was worried that the Danish generals would be unable to act in a 
sensible way: meaning countering the British landings with force. The Admiral 
expected that the British would give the Danish Government an ultimatum when 
their fleet passed the Skaw. In his opinion it had to be rejected and Germany 
informed about Danish willingness to fight England. 59 
On the same day, 22 June, Carl Moltke in Berlin cabled the false, but worrying, 
information that a German newspaper, the “Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger” had report-
ed that the British Government had put out “friendly” feelers to the Danish Gov-
ernment to investigate its reactions to a British operation into the Baltic Sea.60 
The information indicated that some German authorities expected that there 
would be a British operation to follow up the outcome of the battle. 
One week later the Admiral withdrew the modern torpedo boat stationed at 
Bornholm for mine clearing and neutrality patrols against British submarines. 
58  RA. Generalstabens Fæstningssektion 1878-1951 Pk. A 23, Arméingeniørkommandoen, For-
troligt, I.K. Nr. 1247 of 20-06-1916 to Overkommandoen; Generalstabens Operationssektions 
Indkomne Sager 1916, Pk. 6, Sydfronten u.nr. of 20-06-1916 to Overkommandoens Operati-
onssektion; Arméartillerikommandoen, 1914-1919, A Indkomne Sager, 1916 6 22 – 12 31, Pk. 4, 
Overkommandoen Fortroligt F.983(?) af 28-06-1916 til Arméartillerikommandoen, Overkom-
mandoen, Fortroligt, F.984 ag 29-06-1916 til Arméartillerikommandoen.
59  O. Kofoed-Hansen, Daglige optegnelser under krigen, Tage Kårsted (ed.), Flåden under 1. Ver-
denskrig. O. Kofoed-Hansen og V. Jøhnkes optegnelser, (Aarhus 1976) 22-06-1916 and O. Kofoed-
Hansens erindringer, samlede ‘Optegnelser’ pp. 41-46; The quoted text translated into English 
by the author. 
60  RA. Berlin, diplomatisk repræsentation og militærmission, 1913-1935, Politiske indberetninger 
(aflev 1940), 1916, pk. 480, Gesandtskabets Chiffertelegram No. 158 af 22’ Juni 1916 til Uden-
rigsministeriet.
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He gave the reason that the “current demanding” conditions made the decision 
necessary.61 
The Admiral’s position and actions have to be seen within the context of his 
understanding of the demands of Denmark’s geostrategic position. If his country 
chose an alliance with Germany’s enemies and Germany won the war, Denmark 
would cease to exist. If on the other hand his country was coerced into an alli-
ance with Germany and the Western Powers won, the country would be re-estab-
lished, because the victors would understand that Denmark had been forced by 
its geostrategic situation to side with Germany. 
Kofoed-Hansen was not alone in his analysis. In spite of the strong anglophile 
attitude of the Royal Family, among the army and naval officers and in the general 
population, Danish Governments had informed Berlin in 1906-07 and again on 
3 August 1914 that Denmark would never join Germany’s enemies. A practical 
result was that Danish defence plans and rules of neutrality were intended to 
deny the Royal Navy bases for operations in the Baltic Sea. The hope was that by 
paying attention to German defence interest and needs on Danish territory, an 
invasion from the south might be avoided because it was unnecessary. Admi-
ral Kofoed-Hansen became known as a leading and strong-minded supporter of 
the need for a neutral defence profile acceptable to Germany in the years before 
the war, and when the German Envoy had requested a mining of the Great Belt 
“against all belligerents” on the morning of 5 August, the Admiral succeeded in 
extracting a positive response from a hesitant political leadership. This did not 
61  RA. Flaadens Overkommando, Kopibog 1916, I, Flaadens Overkommando O.571 of 03-07-
1916 to Amtmanden i Bornholms Amt.
The concern about a possible reckless RN operation spread in July 1916 from the old 
Commanding Admiral to the young Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the latter’s friend, the 
German Envoy Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau onwards to Berlin and the Baltic Sea 
Fleet. (Danish Defence Library, Photo Collection)
From a London Working Lunch to the Danish summer 1916 war scare   151
mean that the Admiral was unwilling to fight if the Germans invaded. Four days 
earlier he had forced a very unwilling government to accept that the navy would 
fight even in case of a German invasion. In Kofoed-Hansen’s understanding both 
duty as a neutral state and national honour required this. 
However, in late October 1914 he had allied himself with the like-minded 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erik Scavenius, and thereafter forced the rest of the 
government as well as the Naval Ministry Director and the local navy squadron 
commander to accept that any attempt to force the new Great Belt Barrier would 
be met by force, even if such an operation was likely to be suicidal. The anglo-
phile King, Christian X, had been furious, but he could not force the Admiral to 
change his directive.62
The more the Admiral considered the new information from London, the 
more worried he became, and on 1 July he handed an estimate of the situation 
to the Foreign Minister with a copy to the Defence Minister. The memorandum 
had been written in late June. Kofoed-Hansen remembered the information that 
he had received from Stagg on 29 October 1915 based on “the usual English ten-
dency to underestimate the enemy linked to a completely unrealistic overestimate of 
Denmark’s ability to resist Germany”.63
As mentioned earlier, the Danish submarine force had been built primarily 
to participate in the joint defence against a German landing on the east coasts 
of Zealand. However after the outbreak of war the flotilla started to exercise 
for another mission: the deployment to counter a (British) bombardment force 
approaching Copenhagen from the Kattegat through the Sound.64 With the ac-
cess to Køge Bay increasingly blocked by German anti-submarine barriers, the 
Navy had experimented with submarine operations in the Great Belt in January 
and April 1916.65 No later than early June 1916 Kofoed-Hansen had established 
a routine rotation of divisions from the growing number of submarines to work 
with the combined squadron of coastal defence ships and torpedo boats guarding 
the Great Belt mine fields.66 With no ability to locate submerged submarines, this 
62  Michael Clemmesen, The Danish armed forces 1909-1918. Between politicians and strategic rea-
lity, (Copenhagen 2007), pp.33-41; Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, (2010), 
pp. 95-99.
63  O. Kofoed-Hansen, Daglige optegnelser under krigen, Tage Kårsted (ed.), Flåden under 1. Ver-
denskrig. O. Kofoed-Hansen og V. Jøhnkes optegnelser, (Aarhus 1976) 22-06-1916 and O. Kofoed-
Hansens erindringer, samlede ‘Optegnelser’ pp. 41-42. The quoted text translated into English 
by the author.
64  Michael H. Clemmesen, Det lille land før den store krig. De danske farvande, stormagtsstrategier, 
efterretninger og forsvarsforberedelser om kriserne 1911-13, (Odense 2012), pp. 180-196; Clem-
mesen, The Danish Armed Forces 1909-1918, pp. 24-26, 42-47.
65  RA. Flaadens Overkommando Kopibog 1916, 1, Flaadens Overkommando, O. No. 9-13 of 03-
01-1916 to Chefen for Undervandsbaadsflotillen, m.fl.; Flaadens Overkommando, Sagsakter, Pk. 
0.3, 1916, 401-800, Chefen for Undervandsbaadsflotillen U-Nr. 142 of 03-04-1916 to Flaadens 
Overkommando ’Maanedsrapport’.
66  RA. Flaadens Overkommando, Sagsakter, Pk. 0.3, 1916, 1201-1600, Chefen for 2’ Eskadre, For-
troligt, Nr. 743 of 04- 07-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando, ’Rapport Nr. 24’.
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was a very significant addition to the squadron combat power and a significantly 
increased threat to any force attempting to force the barrier. 
By early June the Danish Navy had nine operational diesel submarines, and it 
now started exercising the possibility of operating in the Kattegat, 67 and on 26 
June it started to look for a suitable place for a submarine station and a flying boat 
station for the Great Belt and Kattegat operations. The reconnaissance seems to 
have been considered urgent, and by mid-July three places had been rejected as 
less than suitable for flying boats. On 17 July a possible place had been found at 
Slipshavn close to Nyborg and flanking the open route used by merchant ship 
traffic at the western end of the minefields.68
Still not convinced by Moltke and Castenskiold, Foreign Minister Erik Scav-
enius continued to seek additional information about British intentions. The 
Danish journalist Marinus Yde had been working in London for a British agency 
when the war started. He had returned home in 1915, but in April 1916 he had 
been sent to London paid by Danish trade interests with the approval of Scave-
nius to explain the Danish position and policies in Britain.69 He was now asked 
to seek information from his well-informed contacts. On 4 July Yde reported on 
the conversation that he had had the same day in the “The Economist” office with 
its editor, Francis Hirst. After Yde had rejected an offer of employment, he made 
it clear that he came to seek information about what Hirst thought about the ru-
mours about an English attack on Kiel. The initiative to contact Hirst underlines 
the key role that the 10 June “Economist” article had as a catalyst. The Editor told 
Yde that both the Admiralty and Government had their “selection of less gifted 
persons, who would always be prepared to accept any activistic plan, however luna-
tic”. However in Hirst’s opinion it would be impossible to get 22 government min-
isters to agree. Yde noted that he agreed with Hirst. There was no visible troop 
redeployment.70
The Envoy, Count Castenskiold, also sought additional information, and on 
19 July he reported what the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, 
Lord Charles Hardinge, had told him: the British had information that the Ger-
mans were conducting reconnaissance in Jutland to prepare an occupation of 
the peninsula. Castenskiold urged England not to press Denmark too much, but 
Hardinge just noted that all the neutrals were pleading, however “if all import to 
67  RA. Flaadens Overkommando, Sagsakter, Pk. 0.3, 1916, 1201-1600, Chefen for Undervandsbaads-
flotillen, U-Nr. 215 of 01-06-1916.
68  Ibid., Marineministeriet No. 3846 of 13-07-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando; Premierløjtnant 
A. Grandjean of 13-07-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando; Premierløjtnant Laub of 14-07-1916 




70  RA. Udenrigsministeriet, Gruppeordnede Sager, 10 G53-G80, Pk 10-32, Marinus L. Yde, Privat 
og Confidentielt, of 4-7-1916 to Hr. Departementschef, Kammerherre Herluf Zahle. The quoted 
text translated into English by the author.
From a London Working Lunch to the Danish summer 1916 war scare   153
Germany from these countries had been cut, it would have ended the war”. Casten-
skiold concluded in his cable that as he had expected, Hardinge was in line with 
the Admiralty, the War Office and a large and influential part of the press, even if 
he showed greater awareness of Denmark’s especially difficult position.71
The Danish Navy continued its preparations in the Great Belt. On 20 July Ko-
foed-Hansen decided that a combined station for submarines and flying boats 
should be sited either at Korsør (the squadron base harbour) or near Nyborg and 
ordered the creation of a detailed construction plan. Six days later he received 
the squadron plan for the construction of the facilities in Slipshavn, the site iden-
tified ten days earlier, and on 28 July the Admiral sent his approval to the Naval 
Ministry. The use of the station started immediately, using tents until the planned 
wooden barracks had been constructed. The logistic support for the submarines 
and crews was established from late August.72
Kofoed-Hansen remained worried throughout that summer, and on 22 July he 
made clear to the Defence Minister that it was “imprudent” to let the monarch 
stay in Jutland for two months. (The fact that Christian X’s journey was linked to 
his inspection of army manoeuvres was likely to deepen the Admiral’s worries). 
71  RA. Udenrigsministeriet, Gruppeordnede Sager, 10 G53-G80, Pk 10-32, Kgl. Gesandtskab Lon-
don, Castenskiold, Chiffertelegram of 19-7-2014 to Udenrigsministeriet.
72  RA. Flaadens Overkommando, Kopibog 1916, I, Flaadens Overkommando, O. 608 of 20-07-
1916 to Chefen for 2’ Eskadre; Flaadens Overkommando, Sagsakter, Pk. 0.3, 1916, 1601-2000, 
Chefen for 2’ Eskadre, Nr. 832 of 26-07-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando; Flaadens Overkom-
mando Kopibog 1916 2, Flaadens Overkommando, O. 635 of 28-07-1916 to Marineministeriet; 
Flaadens Overkommando, Sagsakter, Pk. 0.3, 1916, 1601-2000, Chefen for Orlogsværftet, Se-
kretariatet Løbe Nr. 3777 of 12-08-1916 to Marineministeriet; Flaadens Overkommando, Sags-
akter, Pk. 0.3, 1916, 2001-2400, Chefen for Undervandsbaadsflotillen of 30-8-1916 to Flaadens 
Overkommando; Marineministeriet No. 4695 of 01-09-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando; Che-
fen for Undervandsbaadsflotillen U-Nr. 362 of 01-09-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando.
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The Admiral was concerned that the King might be tempted to act independently 
of the government in case of a British landing. Five days later the navy com-
mander had another conversation with the Defence Minister where the latter 
made clear that he did not object to the use of force in case of a British attempt.73
On 23 July Kofoed-Hansen met the German Envoy, Count Ulrich von Brock-
dorff-Rantzau face to face for the first time. The Admiral used the occasion to 
congratulate the diplomat on the German victory at Jutland. The Envoy thanked 
the Admiral and noted that he knew from the foreign ministers about the deci-
sive support (“tatkräftigste Unterstützung”) that the Admiral gave to Scavenius’ 
pro-German neutrality line. That was especially important just at the current mo-
ment (“gerade im gegenwärtigen Augenblick”).
Scavenius and Rantzau maintained an open and very close exchange of ideas 
and information throughout the war, including about the risks of British oper-
ations and potential German reactions.74  In July 1916 Rantzau considered the 
risk of a British operation via Denmark more critical than any time earlier in the 
war, even if he noted that Scavenius thought it likely that any British operation 
would be limited and have the aim of provoking a German occupation of Jutland. 
On 20 July Rantzau had reported that the attempt had been started by “the noto-
rious English spy Narvey”. Two days later the German Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs concluded on the basis of Rantzau’s report that “it would be 
unwise to reject the possibility of a sudden English operation out of hand”. On  23 
August 1916 the Commander-in-Chief of the German Baltic Fleet, Grand Admi-
ral Prince Heinrich, asked what the Admiralty Staff intended to do if Denmark 
was drawn into the war on the enemy side. Prince Heinrich’s question ante-dates 
by a few days the Romanian entry into the war that is normally considered the 
motivation for restarting the planning for a war against Denmark that had been 
frozen by Wilhelm II’s decision to accept Danish neutrality in February 1905.75 
Thus Stagg’s information on 14 June was an additional reason why the German 
Admiralty Staff considered it necessary in autumn 1916 to develop what became 
the first version of “Fall J”, the contingency war plan against Denmark. The infor-
73  O. Kofoed-Hansen Daglige Optegnelser under krigen, Tage Kaarsted: Flåden under første ver-
denskrig. O. Kofoed-Hansen og V. Jøhnkes optegnelser, (Århus 1976).
74  RA. German planning file copies brought to Denmark, Pk. 91-læg 8, Ganz geheim Telegram 
from Rantzau to Auswärtiges Amt 23-07-19; Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, pp. 155-
159, 329-342; Viggo Sjøqvist, Erik Scavenius. En biografi. Bind 1. 1877-1920, (Copenhagen 
1973).
75  RA. Håndskriftsamlingen, XVI. Danica, Auswärtiges Amt, Pk. 87-88, Telegramm, of 21-7-
1916, Nr. 16, Der Unterstaatssekretär an Exzellens von Jagow (with copy to Chef des Gener-
alstabes des Feldheeres); Telegramm of 3-9-1916 from Der k. Gesandte, Kopenhagen Nr. 1281 
to Auswärtiges Amt (translations by author); Gerhard P. Gross, German Plans to occupy Den-
mark, ”Case J” 1916-1918, Michael Epkenhans & Gerhard P. Gross (eds.), The Danish Straits and 
German Naval Power 1905-1918, (Potsdam 2010), pp. 156-157 and n. 13; Carl-Axel Gemzell, 
Organization, Conflict, and Innovation. A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1940, 
(Lund 1973), pp. 163-174, 225-227, 238-245.
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mation of a now more likely British attempt at entry combined with the risk of a 
new Danish government formed by the Opposition, the opportunism of another 
neutral, Romania, and the economic pressures against Denmark that would follow 
a resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare, made planning against Denmark es-
sential.  For a Dane it is also interesting to note that by Erik Scavenius’s close and 
completely open relationship with the German Envoy, which he considered to be 
essential for keeping Denmark out of the war, the Danish minister had added a 
catalyst to renewed German war-planning against his country.
One likely effect of the reports from the 14 June 1916 meeting: the Army begs 
Britain for assistance – and the London reaction
When the worrying news arrived from London in mid-June the dynamic, but 
over-worked and high-strung Danish Chief of the General Staff, Major-General 
Berthel Palle Berthelsen, had been ill and immobilised with a serious lumbago 
attack. On 23 June Kofoed-Hansen proposed in vain to the Defence Minister that 
the minister should use the illness to replace the General, whose views on Danish 
neutrality policies were directly contrary to those of the Admiral.76
However, by mid-July Berthelsen, a general with keen political sense, was back, 
and soon he noted developments that inspired him to action. In August-Septem-
ber 1916 a domestic political crisis (caused by lack of government openness and 
truthfulness in relation to negotiations to sell the Danish West-Indian Islands 
to the U.S.) was close to provoking the fall of the Danish government. The crisis 
might create a window of opportunity to improve the Danish defence capabilities.
The domestic political crisis combined with the strategic crisis brought about, 
in part, by the report of the Moltke-Stagg lunch. The political response was to 
scale back all defence efforts. The army experienced a sudden freeze on both 
routine and supplementary defence preparations. The call-up of reserves for the 
annual large-scale autumn exercises was cancelled. Further development of the 
field fortifications in Jutland (preparing the Lim Fjord position) was vetoed. The 
argument given by the Defence Minister was that such works would undermine 
German confidence in Danish neutrality, especially after the Romanian entry into 
the conflict.77
The only possible explanation to present-day historians is that Rantzau had 
informed the Danish Government and the Defence Minister, Peter Munch, via 
Scavenius, about the recent start of German planning against Denmark and its 
focus on Jutland. Munch, a powerful intellectual, had been the author of his par-
ty’s (Det Radikale Venstre) defence policy when the party programme had been 
76  Det Kongelige Bibliotek (The Danish Royal Library) (KB), Ny Kgl. Samling 5082, 4o, August 
Tuxens Brevsamling, II. Breve fra fremmede, 4. Fra J.V. Gørtz , Læg 1916, Letters of 14-06 and 
14-07-1916; O. Kofoed-Hansen Daglige Optegnelser under krigen, Tage Kaarsted, Flåden under 
første verdenskrig. O. Kofoed-Hansen og V. Jøhnkes optegnelser, (Aarhus 1976).
77  KB. Ny Kgl. Samling 5082, 4o, August Tuxens Brevsamling, II. Breve fra fremmede, 4. Fra J.V. 
Gørtz , Læg 1916, Letter of 20-09-1916.
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developed in spring 1905. His views were clear and constant through the next 35 
years as a leading politician: Service in the military promoted conservative and 
anachronistic militaristic attitudes in conflict with the future that he sought for 
his nation; from the start of his service as Defence Minister he sought to democ-
ratise the armed services and improve the social conditions of their personnel. 
Second, the armed forces of a small state such as Denmark were a useless waste 
of resources, as it was obvious to any sound mind that they would always remain 
too weak to prevent or stop an invasion by a Great Power. Military resources 
stronger than those required for policing the borders might actually undermine 
security by attracting or provoking interest such as the existence of the Danish 
fleet that had led to the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. The main threat 
for a small state in war was therefore not great power operations that could not be 
prevented anyway, but the serious losses and destruction that would be the result 
of armed resistance. The stronger the defence forces, the more destruction would 
become possible. 
When Munch became Defence Minister in a minority government in sum-
mer 1913 he had committed himself to administer the armed forces according 
to the defence laws is spite of his and his party’s fundamental disagreement with 
their substance. His party had fought a parliamentary election in 1910 to have the 
laws changed – and lost.78 During autumn 1915 the Opposition had challenged 
78  Tage Kaarsted, Hvad skal det nytte? De radikale og forsvaret 1894-1914, (Odense 1974); Carsten 
Staur, ”P. Munch og forsvarsspørgsmålet ca. 1900-1910”, Historisk Tidsskrift, Bind 81, Hæfte 1, 
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for the “Defence Cause”, the Chief of 
General Staff, Major-General Palle 
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his willingness live up to his commitment, and in order to prove his loyalty he 
had been forced to accept the construction of the Tune Position and committed 
himself to the purchasing and armament programmes. Now the West-Indies’ do-
mestic crisis combined with increased external threats, but Munch apparently 
decided to accept the domestic political risks to minimise the risk of destructive 
defensive fighting in Denmark. 
Berthelsen decided to react to the crisis caused by the sudden loss of political 
support for the defence preparations and readiness by contacting the new Brit-
ish Minister, Sir Ralph Spencer Paget, directly in a letter to seek assistance. It is 
possible to piece together the information received during the first weeks of Sep-
tember that probably triggered the General’s decision. In a letter dated 22 August 
he had thanked the Danish Envoy in Berlin, Carl Moltke, for his General Sum-
mary despatch (“Almindelig Oversigt”) from 15 August. In the despatch Moltke 
assessed that the German situation on the Western Front was stable, and that 
Germany had succeeded in containing the crisis on the Austrian southern part 
of the Eastern Front by sending German troops. He went on that the German 
Deputy Foreign Secretary remained confident that the Romanians would remain 
neutral.79 This confident evaluation proved mistaken, and the situation changed 
quickly following Romania’s decision to enter the war against Germany. On 31 
August Carl Moltke reported that there were widespread rumours in Berlin that 
Denmark would follow Romania in declaring war. The rumours continued the 
following days despite Moltke’s efforts to counter them. The Germans had no-
ticed that a number of Danes had returned home to join the forces, and Moltke 
warned Danes against travelling to Germany. On 18 September the “Lokal-An-
zeiger” noted that the Scandinavian States were under strong British pressure to 
join the war against the Central Powers.80 The urgency, and the German focus on 
the Jutland Peninsula, was highlighted by intelligence work conducted in Den-
mark on 22 and 23 September concerning the massive field fortification being 
constructed across North Schleswig.81 This was interpreted as a sign that Germa-
ny had intelligence about an impending British operation.
1981; Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, chapters 8 to 15; Clemmesen, Det lille land før den 
store krig, pp. 388, 463, 485.
79  RA. Berlin, diplomatisk repræsentation og militærmission, 1913-1935, Politiske indberetninger 
(aflev 1940), 1916, pk. 480, Berlin, No. LXXVIII ”Almindelig Oversigt” of 15-8-1916; Chefen for 
Generalstaben of 22-8-1916 to Hr. Greve C. Moltke.
80  RA. Berlin, diplomatisk repræsentation og militærmission, 1913-1935, Politiske indberetninger 
(aflev 1940), 1916, pk. 481,Gesandtskabets Chiffertelegram No. 277 of 31-8-1916 to Udenrigs-
ministeriet; Berlin, No. LXXXI ”Dansk Tysk Politik” of 4-9-1916; Berlin, No. LXXXVI ”Nordisk 
Ministerkonference i Christiania” of 18-9-1916; Lokal-Anzeiger No. 478 (Morgen) 18-9-1916, 
”Der englische Druck auf Skandinavien”. 
81  RA. Gørtz Privatarkiv: Breve from GL Tuxen, Letter of 22-09-1916, 2’ Generalkommando, De-
tachementer, Esbjerg 1914-1919 Pk. K1, 2’ Generalkommando, Strængt fortroligt Tilintetgøres, 
of 23-09-1916 to Detachement Esbjerg.
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The General’s request for help started explaining that the mobilised army in 
Jutland only consisted of fourteen weakly-supported infantry battalions. In case 
of a German attack it would have to withdraw to the Lim Fjord island of Morso 
(Mors) without being able to offer any resistance before then. He emphasised that 
any deployment of British troops to Jutland would be a futile waste. The Danish 
defence planning had deliberately abandoned Jutland and Funen in order to have 
sufficient forces for the defence of Zealand and Copenhagen.
After having mentioned the Tune Position he generated his first request. The 
German Hessen-class pre-Dreadnought could bombard the Copenhagen sub-
urb of Valby from its position behind the minefield. As a first priority Denmark 
therefore needed four, preferably eight, heavy cannons of 31-38 cm calibre with 
100 shells each for the coastal forts on the south coast of Amager.
As a second priority the Army needed high explosive shells for the field ar-
tillery, machine guns, 50.000 infantry rifles and at least 70 million small arms 
rounds:
“If England does not contemplate entering the Baltic or if intention is to keep Den-
mark entirely out of the war the whole matter has no interest. Should on the other 
hand there be possibility, even most remote, that Denmark can be involved in the 
war it will then be of very greatest interest for England either to see Denmark gets 
stores she lacks or that British Army should bring them with them when they come.” 
The letter underlined that an effective defence of Copenhagen would require 
50.000 more men than presently available.
In relation to the heavy cannon the British were only asked to make a U.S. firm – 
to be named later – send an offer directly to Danish Army HQs, not to the War 
Office. The letter urged that the “present” Danish government should not be in-
formed about Britain’s role as facilitator.
The British Minister, Ralph Paget, probably received Berthelsen’s letter on 25 
September, when he warned London by telegram that he had received the doc-
ument. The letter was then translated from Danish and sent to London on 28 
September. 
Two days later Berthelsen must have felt that the domestic political “window” 
to gain support for a stronger defence effort was closing. The new Government 
formed on 30 September was the old cabinet with observers from the supporting 
and opposition parties, so Munch continued as Defence Minister.
In his covering letter Paget doubted that Denmark could resist “for any length 
of time”, no matter what guns and ammunition they got. The cannon would only 
give the Germans an excuse for invading and add to the “other good things here” 
that they could seize. The Envoy made clear that assistance should depend on 
whether the Danish Government made a commitment to co-operate with the 
British, but he doubted that “we could even induce them to venture to give this”. 
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On the arrival of the letter and Paget’s note in London one week later, it was sent 
to the British War Office for comments.82
Even if Paget was critical, Britain seems to have acted as the facilitator Berthels-
en had requested. In early December the Danish War Office purchasing mission 
in the United States received an offer from Bethlehem Steel Corporation for the 
delivery of six 35 cm cannon with a delivery time of 18-24 months. At that time 
the Danish artillery specialists had already decided that half the guns should be 
placed in a battery on the south point of Amager and the other half in a battery at 
Hundige further up the coast from Mosede Battery and the Tune Position flank. 
However, Berthelsen had been too optimistic in his estimate of the Army’s ability 
to get government approval for the offer. The “present” government had stayed 
in power. On 3 January Peter Munch informed the mission in America that the 
offer was of no interest.83
It took less than a week for the British Admiralty War Staff and the War Office 
General Staff to produce a common reaction to Berthelsen’s begging and Paget’s 
discouragement. Staffing had started on 1 October, when the Admiralty War Staff 
had produced a detailed report on the “Coast Defences of Denmark”. The next day 
the chief of staff, Sir Henry Oliver, drafted an appreciation named “Denmark” 
for the First Lord of the Admiralty and First Sea Lord analysing the possibilities 
of supporting Denmark. The arguments were to be used in the discussion with 
the Army about possible actions. During his many months in office Oliver had 
always been and remained highly critical of any Royal Navy operations east of the 
Skaw, and he had no problems in securing War Office support for his pessimistic 
views.
The agreement between the British armed services was given in the form of 
the secret memorandum on “The Military Situation in Denmark” printed for the 
Cabinet on 11 October. It closely followed Oliver’s 2 October appreciation. It 
noted the recent “nervousness in Denmark” about possible German hostile de-
signs. It repeated Berthelsen’s description of the defence situation and concluded: 
“It must be clear … that the Danes are not at present in a position to protect their 
country from a German attack”. It was also clear that any signs of a British ex-
pedition to Denmark were likely to trigger a German invasion. The only places 
that were likely to be available for landing, when the British forces arrived, would 
be the district north of the Lim Fjord or within the Copenhagen defences. This 
assumed that the necessary British Army forces were available and could be se-
82  TNA, FO 371/2754, pp. 272-277; Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, pp.161-165, argues why 
the author of the letter must have been Berthelsen. The translation into English is the one done 
by the legation for its report.
83  RA. Arméoverkommandoen, Arméartillerikommandoen, 1914-1919, A Indkomne Sager 1916 
6 22 – 12 31, Pk. 4, Hærens tekniske Korps, Fortroligt, K. 4756 of 04-12-1916 to Arméartilleri-
kommandoen; Den flydende Defension, Løbe-Nr. 1062 Fortroligt, of 24-08-1916 to Arméartil-
lerikommandoen; Krigsministeriet, 3 Kontor. Pk. C.26. Kopibog over artillerisager 1914-1924: 
1917 1 -829, Krigsministeriet, C.a. 13 of 03-01-1917 to Hærens tekniske Korps.
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cretly assembled and embarked. However, even if this were possible, they “could 
not be supplied and maintained in Denmark except at the greatest risk to our naval 
supremacy, on which the Allied cause depends, unless the German fleet was disposed 
of”. The sea transport of the force and later supply transports had to sail close 
to the main German naval base and were very vulnerable to U-boat attacks. A 
large force of destroyers backed by capital ships would therefore have to be main-
tained in Danish waters. It would also be difficult to find the necessary transports 
because of other urgent requirements and the loss of tonnage to U-boats. Even 
if the expeditionary corps was sent, it was unlikely to be able to match the maxi-
mum force that Germany would be able to build up against it. Therefore an oper-
ation to support Denmark was not likely to be successful.84 
It had taken less than three months for the distorted echo of Stagg’s warning to 
reach its source and its logic to be rejected. Only the aggressive retired Admiral-
of-the-Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson disagreed with Henry Oliver. In a memorandum 
from late March 1917 he recommended that the Royal Navy response to a Ger-
man invasion of Denmark should be the use of the Danish island of Zealand and 
possibly that of Funen as base for offensive operations into the Baltic Sea.85 How-
ever, as the old admiral had no influence on operations, his opinion was irrele-
vant. On the other hand it is very likely that activists from the Naval Intelligence 
such as Stagg, Consett and Hall shared the old admiral’s wish for a more aggres-
sive strategy than the one managed by Balfour and Oliver in London and Jellicoe 
with the Grand Fleet. Even before Wilson finished his memorandum, Consett 
worked to get the Norwegians to allow the Americans to base their battle fleet 
at Stavanger, if or rather when they joined the Allies.86 Even the DNI, Reginald 
Hall, would work for a limited operation through the Sound before 1917 ended, 
an operation that should help the British Baltic submarine flotilla to escape home 
and keep the powerful Russian Novik-class destroyers and Russian naval code 
breakers out of German reach.87 
Stagg’s “irresponsible” misinformation to Admiral Kofoed-Hansen in autumn 
1915 and to Frederik Moltke during the working lunch probably mirrored what 
he would like to see happen, and if his presentation of his wishes as those of more 
responsible naval decision-makers triggered German concern or even action, he 
could only see that as justified and beneficial for his country and service.  
84  TNA. ADM 137/1881, p. 191 and verso, Secret, The Military Situation in Denmark, Prepared 
by the Admiralty War Staff and the General Staff, War Office, (signed Robertson) 11-11-1916; 
ADM 137/500, pp. 3, 56-91; For Oliver’s constant views: Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej 
mod 9. april, pp. 113f, 125, 130, 136, 205, 209, 219, 236, 240, 251, 277.
85  TNA. ADM 137/500, pp. 92-95, Arthur Wilson of 25-3-1917.
86  Michael H. Clemmesen, Den lange vej mod 9. april, (2010), chapter 33.
87  Ibid., chapter 22.
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Frederik Moltke and Frank Stagg thereafter
No surviving documents in the Danish legation or War Office files inform us 
how the British wish to get Moltke out of the country was communicated to the 
Danish Envoy – if at all – or directly to the Copenhagen authorities. The most 
likely reason is that both the British and Danish authorities wanted to handle 
the matter discreetly and possibly only verbally. Therefore Moltke’s posting to the 
purchasing mission in the U.S. was dealt with as an Army Technical Corps mat-
ter, made necessary by the less liberal British export licensing regime. It could be 
presented as logical as the remaining main purchasing activities were in America. 
The only result of the new posting was that the Danish King approved a one-year 
extension of Moltke’s secondment to the Army Technical Corps on 26 July 1916, 
the day when he returned to Copenhagen. Another extension was approved on 
20 February 1918, after it had been decided to close the purchasing mission in the 
U.S., and was valid until 31 July 1919.88 
During his time in the U.S., Moltke worked in New York City. His title was 
the impressive “Director of Army Contracts Attached to the Danish Legation”, but 
the purchasing work load is likely to have dwindled significantly six months af-
ter his arrival in America as a direct result of the Danish Government’s effective 
freeze on defence preparations from autumn 1916. The inclusion of representa-
tives from the Opposition parties as a result of the autumn West-Indies’ crisis had 
removed the risk of the Opposition using Munch’s administration of the defence 
laws to attack the Government as had happened in autumn 1915. Hereafter the 
Defence and Foreign Ministers only needed to convince the representatives in the 
ministers’ meetings that additional defence preparations were a bad idea for a va-
riety of reasons. In relation to purchasing projects, Munch could stop them with-
out having to involve others.89 The resumption of German unrestricted U-boat 
warfare in February 1917, and the U.S. entry into the war two months later must 
have combined to reduce the likelihood of additional defence contracts even fur-
ther, and in summer 1917 there followed formal U.S. export restrictions. 
With his purchasing work load reduced, the energetic Moltke got involved in 
other matters. A communication from him in the Danish Washington legation 
88  RA. Krigsministeriet, 1. Kontor, Forestillinger 1916 og 1917, Pk. 1122, Forsvarsministeren, A.A. 
No. 117 af 25-7-1916 to Kongen; Forestillinger 1918-1919, Pk. 1123-1124, Forsvarsministeren, 
A.A. No. 20 af 19-2-1918 to Kongen; Kundgørelse A for Hæren, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919.
89  For Munch’s defence improvement management in early 1917, see: Tage Kaarsted (ed.), Minis-
termødeprotokol 1916-1918. Kirkeminister Th. Povlsens referater, (Aarhus 1973), 15-1-1917; P. 
Munch, Erindringer 1914-1918. Under den første Verdenskrig, (Copenhagen 1961), pp.187-197; 
Michael H. Clemmesen & Anders Osvald Thorkilsen, Mod fornyelsen af Københavns forsvar 
1915-18, (Copenhagen 2009) follows two examples; for a third one dealing with American trac-
tors for the approved new artillery, see: RA. Krigsministeriet, 3 Kontor. Pk. C.26. Kopibog over 
artillerisager 1914-1924: 1917 1-829, Krigsministeriet, C.a. 165 of 26-01-1917 to Overkomman-
doen; Krigsministeriet C.a. 257 of 09-02-1917 to Hærens tekniske Korps; Gørtz Privatarkiv: 
Breve fra GL Tuxen: Letter of 08-02-1917; KB. Ny Kgl. Samling 5082, 4o August Tuxens Brev-
samling, II. Breve fra fremmede. 4. Fra J.V. Gørtz, Læg 1917-1928, Letter of 04-02-1917.
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files documents a successful attempt to have the error in the “New York Times” 
article “Terrorizing Norway” on 28 June corrected two days later. The article ac-
cused the Danish Foreign Minister of having supported pro-German policies at 
a May Stockholm conference, but Moltke’s intervention with the editor made the 
newspaper publish a correction making clear that the statement had been made 
by Thorvald Stauning, the Social Democratic representative in the Government, 
as a private person and party leader.90 
Even with his official workload reduced, Moltke continued to act as a combi-
nation of purchasing official and de facto military attaché. As long as he received 
requests from home he continued his energetic shopping, and as late as mid-Jan-
uary 1918 sent a massive report with 33 annexes that included a description of 
a new shell or grenade and a new machine gun. However, on 21 February 1918, 
Moltke was recalled, even if the delivery of the 30 million 8 mm cartridges that 
he had taken over from Petersen had still not taken place. He had earlier been 
informed by telegram that the Danish War Office considered a reorganisation 
that would mean his withdrawal, and on 18 February it was decided to end his 
work in New York. The Envoy in Washington should be responsible in the future, 
including shipping the small arms ammunition to Denmark. Nørresø wrote that 
he regretted Moltke’s withdrawal, but when back in Copenhagen his knowledge 
about the U.S. contacts would be available to all. The General ended by writing 
that he looked forward to speaking with Moltke again “after such a long time and 
so many stormy events”. He was also happy that the family would be united and 
signed: “your devoted and grateful”.91
It was probably only when back in Denmark that Moltke heard about the ru-
mours and suspicion, and in late October 1918 he tried to clear himself via the 
London Legation. He must finally have realised that it had been a mistake for 
him not to have taken seriously the suspicions that he must have felt 18 months 
earlier and confronted them. That suspicion had not faded with his move to New 
York but moved with him, and now he failed to be cleared. The Director of Naval 
Intelligence concluded on 9 November that he did “not consider it possible so say 
… (that Frederik Moltke’s) actions were entirely free from suspicion during his stay 
in England”. In commenting on Moltke’s attempt to be cleared, M.I.5 attached 
the old 17 June report and added the information that since June 1916 “Count 
Moltke has been attached to the Danish Legation at Washington and whilst there 
became the subject of strong suspicion”. The comment, however, was made with-
90  RA. Washington D.C., diplomatisk repræsentation, Politiske Depecher til Udenrigsministeriet, 
1917-1921, Pk. 251, Ritmester Moltke, New York, Telegraferer indhold af artikel i ”Times” ang. 
Stauning, af 28-6-1917 (and the following documents); Director of Army Contracts attached to 
the Danish Legation, New York, A.880of 9-7-1917 to Højvelbaarne, Hr. Kammerherre C. Brun.
91  RA. Chefen for Hæren. Hærens Tekniske Korps, C. Kopibøger, kommissioner & udland, 1914-
1920, Pk. 2, Ritmester F. Greve Moltke, p.t. New York, Fortroligt A.1296 (”Hermed 33 bilag”); 
Nørresø, M.1314 of 21-2-1918 to ”Kære Ritmester, Greve Moltke”; C. Indgående skrivelser fra 
Krigsministeriet, 1915-1918, Pk. 23. The quoted text translated into English by the author.
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out describing the grounds or sources for that suspicion. The security service 
recommended rejection of Moltke’s attempt to clear his name. On 28 November 
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty during 
Moltke’s time in London and the disappearance of the London air defence plan, 
informed the Danish envoy of the rejection, using the words of the Director of 
Naval Intelligence.92
One may consider what incriminating information the MI5 and MI1c could 
have had in addition to what was presented in the 17 June memorandum. Read-
ing the outline article, the British historian Richard Dunley considered it possible 
that the Dane’s MI5-file contained more incriminating information about suspi-
cious behaviour. 
From the arguments used in the memorandum, the author consider it most 
likely that any such information would reinforce the suspicion generated by 
Moltke’s energetic de facto military attaché activities from his interest in air de-
fence to the search for secrets about the results of the naval battle.
MI5 would know that Moltke continued to seek classified information from 
his many contacts, information that the British had to hate see leaving the coun-
try. One possibility is that such additional information came from an ability to 
read what Moltke and the Envoy sent by coded telegram to Copenhagen. The 
British have released the decrypted transcript of Danish (and other) diplomat-
ic telegrams from the early post-war period, and it is most likely that the code 
had been broken earlier. If the suspicion was supported by severely restricted in-
formation from sensitive decryption activities it is clear why the memorandum 
could convince those few informed even without more evidence or arguments.93
At the end of the war the situation for Moltke worsened. In late 1918 the Royal 
Navy finally entered the Baltic as Stagg had warned on 14 June 1916. Copenhagen 
became the main British base for intervention in the Baltic States and the Finnish 
Gulf, and the operations were supported by a Secret Service operation. It is clear 
that the Danish authorities were made aware of the British accusations against 
Moltke. It is only unclear whether the information came directly from Stagg or 
from another source. The situation forced Moltke to act again. A suspected Ger-
man spy had no future in any Danish Army, and in 1919 Denmark had become 
a de facto British ally against Soviet Russia. In June 1919 he applied for early 
retirement from the Army. In all other cases the War Office proposal to the King 
included a rather extended argument as to how and why he should decide as 
recommended. In Moltke’s case this did not happen, making all-too-evident that 
both the Defence Minister and the King knew the reason for the application. It 
92  TNA. FO 371/3361, pp. 342, 344, 348-349, N.I.D. L5727 of 09-11-1918; MI5. War Office 
(?).F.273/78/M.I.5. of 25-11-1918; F.O. No. 194794/W.30 of 28-11-1918 to the Danish Minister.
93  TNA. HW 12/2, one example is: “THE COPENHAGEN NEGOTIATIONS” The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen No.440 of 26-11-1919 to the Danish Legation, Washington, the 
decrypt of 9-12-1919 distributed to D.N.I., W.O.(5), F.O....
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simply noted that Moltke had asked permission to retire and that the King should 
give his approval. This was granted on 25 June.94
Even after retirement, Moltke apparently considered it essential to clear his 
name. In mid-October 1920 he approached the Secretary of the British Lega-
tion, Hubert Grant Watson, and asked for an opportunity to go to England to 
explain himself to the relevant British officials. He had informed Grant Watson 
that “Nothing definite” had ever been brought against him. Both in England and 
later in America he was simply “asked to leave”. Moltke was now the “President 
of the local club here”. He was “determined to fight the rumours that he acted as a 
German spy”. Grant Watson was convinced that Moltke “got himself into a false 
position rather through stupidity than knavery”. Even if the Foreign Office desk 
officer noted on 29 October that “Count Moltke appears to have been a most un-
desirable person”, Sir Eyre Crowe asked the Director of Military Intelligence on 5 
November if a visit would be possible. MI5 consulted with Naval Intelligence and 
both agreed that a visit by Moltke had “no useful purpose”, and the Copenhagen 
Legation – both the Envoy and Grant Watson – was informed.95 As is clear from 
the narrative neither MI5 nor Stagg’s organisation had a good reason to change 
their opinion. 
MI5 had no good reason to do so, as the service had closed the case of the 
missing air defence plan by naming their prime suspect and getting him punished 
by destroying his reputation. Stagg had been responsible for the “knavery”. He 
gave Moltke the rope to hang himself in front of the already convinced MI5 agent, 
most likely the Dane’s case officer, by doing what Stagg knew he would and should 
do: asking “suspicious” questions about “secret” matters. If Stagg actually aimed at 
nourishing German paranoia by the misinformation to provoke an aggression 
that brought a British response, the “knavery” was also directed against what he 
considered a lame Allied strategy towards Denmark. It would be a continuation 
of the effort that he had started with accusations against Richard Turner. 
Even after Moltke’s retirement from the Army, the rumours seem not to have 
been believed among his peers. During the following years he was asked to serve 
on the board of key Danish armament and heavy industry companies such as the 
Danish Recoil Rifle Syndicate and the Danish Explosives Factories.96 If consulted, 
General Nørresø, still Director of Ordnance, would have been a strong advocate 
of such employment. 
Stagg’s career in Scandinavian intelligence did not end in 1918. In spring 1940 
the 55-year-old Stagg returned to work as Naval Control Service Officer in Co-
94  RA. Krigsministeriet, 1. Kontor, Forestillinger 1918-1919, Pk. 1123-1124, Forsvarsministeren, 
A.A. No. 146 af 24-6-1919 to Kongen.
95  TNA. FO 371/5385, “Extract from letter to Mr. Palairet from Mr. Grant Watson of 15-10-1920” 
and the F.O. covering note of 29-10-1920; F.O. No. N 1433/1433/15 to the D.M.I of 5-11-1920; 
Director of Military Intelligence, P.F. 273/78/MI5 to F.O. of 15-11-1920.
96  Information from Henrik Moltke 16-11-2014.
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penhagen and Trondheim.97 After the Germans occupied Denmark on 9 April 
1940 in line with an updated version of the “Fall J” operation planning that his 
disinformation had probably contributed to trigger in 1916, Stagg was evacuated 
on the diplomatic train. From late autumn 1940 he became daily leader of SOE’s 
Scandinavian organisation. Here he became responsible for the recruitment and 
training of the Danes thereafter dispatched to build the resistance network.98
Final observations
After the failures of the Dardanelles operation and the Western Front offensives 
in 1915, the Entente Powers sought victory in 1916 by combined massive offen-
sives in both east and west, reinforced in the west by Kitchener’s new army. The 
Royal Navy was still hoping for victory in a major naval battle, but it also realised 
that it had to make the economic pressure against Germany more effective. By 
June 1916 the naval battle had failed to reach a decision and Kitchener had been 
killed on his way to Russia to make the combined warfare more effective.
Among the Central Powers, summer 1916 was a period of desperation and 
fatigue. The German Army manpower pool was emptying at Verdun, in South-
East Russia to prevent an Austrian collapse and finally at the Somme. To seek 
a decisive naval battle had proved too risky. Air bombardment of the enemy 
homelands had not triggered panic and collapse. The only potential ‘quick fix’ 
was effective submarine warfare. Otherwise Germany would be limited to active 
strategic defence for many months ahead, limiting damage by effective coun-
ter-offensives like that in Romania or pre-emptive operations such as those now 
prepared against Denmark, the Netherlands and later Norway. 
To this unstable phase of the war Stagg added his equivalent to the “butterfly” 
of Chaos Theory. Germany’s actions and planning to compensate for her weak-
nesses influenced the situation of her small neutral neighbours. The Danish Army 
was already deeply worried by the development, and what Stagg said added a new 
element to their worries and of course a possible opportunity should British assis-
tance materialise. It probably inspired Berthelsen in his plea to the British Envoy 
that was bound be rejected by the combination of Oliver’s risk-adverse Admiralty 
War Staff and Robertson’s Western Front-centric General Staff. 
The Danish Commanding Admiral’s previous experience with Stagg rein-
forced his worry that the Royal Navy and British Government might actually be 
willing to risk a Baltic operation, and his views were communicated to Berlin via 
the Danish Foreign Minister and German Envoy to Copenhagen, undermining 
Danish security. First it helped provoke renewed German war planning against 
the country. Second it inspired an ideologically-based reduction of Danish de-
97  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Noel_Stagg (accessed 14-10-2014)
98  Knud J. V. Jespersen, Med hjælp fra England. Bind I, (Odense 1999), pp. 76-77.
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fence readiness that actually increased the German requirement to defend her 
northern front herself, if necessary by occupying parts of Denmark.
Another example of a somewhat similar “butterfly” effect of faulty intelligence 
during the same phase of the war was the information from a meeting in the 
American community in London on 20 May 1917 that the U.S. Navy would oper-
ate from a base in Southern Norway. The faulty intelligence probably came from a 
Swedish source. After the information had reached Ludendorff, war preparations 
against Norway were accelerated and the plans against Denmark consolidated to 
cover the entire Jutland peninsula.99
Finally it should be emphasised that Frederik Moltke’s problem was and is a 
general one: when accused of working as an agent for a foreign power on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence, it is impossible to clear yourself effectively. The 
accusers have no interest in changing their opinion, and even if the side that you 
were supposed to work for should deny any employment, that denial lacks credi-
bility. As the accusation takes the form of a widespread rumour, the accused can-
not be cleared through a libel case in court, especially if the source of the rumour 
is foreign. Even if Moltke had left a personal record such as a diary, it would be 
seen as doctored and the stains of suspicion would remain.100
Resumé
Den 14. juni 1916 mødte den danske indkøbsofficer i London, ritmester grev 
Frederik Moltke, sin britiske kontaktofficer fra Admiralitetet, den dansktalende 
efterretningsofficer orlogskaptajn Frank Stagg til en arbejdsfrokost. En anonym 
kontraefterretningsofficer fra MI5 overværede mødet, fordi de britiske efterret-
ningstjenester mistænkte Moltke for at være tysk agent og for i det sene efterår 
1915 at have stjålet en plan visende artilleriforsvaret ved London fra Admiralitet. 
Moltkes opgave ved mødet var at hjælpe sin gesandt, grev Castenskiold, med 
at afklare briternes syn på udfaldet af Jyllands-slaget to uger tidligere. Gesandten 
var nervøs for, at briterne var så optimistiske efter slaget, at de ville udnytte situ-
ationen til at trænge ind i Østersøen, hvilket ville udløse en tysk operation mod 
Danmark.  Danskerens energiske forsøg på at få Stagg til at give oplysninger, som 
MI5-agenten opfattede som hemmelige, gjorde, at kontraefterretningsofficeren i 
en rapport tre dage senere med succes argumenterede for, at Moltke måtte press-
es ud af England. 
Stagg, hvis primære arbejde med at hindre, at kontrabande nåede Tyskland, 
havde haft andre problemer med den effektive indkøbsofficer, og han gjorde 
099  Karl Erik Haug, ”Falls Norwegen auf die Seite unserer Feinde tritt”, Det tysk-norske forhold fra 
sommeren 1916 til utgangen av 1917, (non published master thesis, Trondheim 1994), pp. 124-
128; Karl Erik Haug: Tyske Krigsplaner og Norge under 1. Verdenskrig, (Norsk) Historisk Tids-
skrift (Oslo) 4/1995.
100  According to his grandson Henrik Moltke, Frederik Moltke left no personal archive.
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åbenbart intet for at forklare MI5-manden, at Moltkes professionelle nysger-
righed var et naturligt resultat af grevens rolle som de facto militærattaché.  Da 
briterne i forvejen havde saboteret Moltkes arbejde med at importere råmate-
rialer til dansk ammunitionsproduktion, valgte myndighederne i København at 
flytte den effektive ritmester til indkøbsarbejde i New York.
Moltkes rapport om frokostmødet forstærkede gesandtens nervøsitet, hvilket 
blev understreget i en depeche til København dagen efter mødet. I den danske 
hovedstad blev selv den skeptiske danske flådechef, viceadmiral Kofoed-Hansen, 
overbevist om, at der rent faktisk var øget risiko for et britisk passageforsøg. Via 
den danske udenrigsminister, Erik Scavenius, og hans tætte bekendte, den tyske 
gesandt, nåede opfattelsen af en øget engelsk trussel til Berlin i juli og august og 
var muligvis medvirkende til at udløse den første tyske krigsplanlægning mod 
Danmark siden februar 1905. Den danske hærledelse, der af andre grunde i for-
vejen så den tyske trussel mod Sjælland som stærkt øget, endte med at søge hjælp 
direkte fra den britiske gesandt, uden om den danske regering. 
Den engelske mistanke forfulgte Moltke til USA, og i slutningen af februar 
1918 måtte han rejse hjem til København. Her blev han klar over karakteren og 
alvoren af den britiske mistanke, og han forsøgte forgæves at blive renset. Dette 
blev afvist af briterne uden reel begrundelse, og da han ikke kunne få genoprejs-
ning, søgte og fik Moltke sin afsked fra hæren. Herefter søgte han med støtte af 
den britiske legation i København om britisk tilladelse til at rejste til London, så 
han kunne forklare sine handlinger i 1915-16, og igen blev han afvist. Det sejrrige 
Storbritanniens myndigheder så ingen grund til at ændre mening. 
De personer, der kendte den danske greve, var dog aldrig i tvivl om hans loyal-
itet, og han beskæftiges nu med bestyrelsesarbejde i dansk industri, herunder 
våbenindustrien.
